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Abstract 
 
The 2007/2008 global financial crisis has reignited the debate regarding the need for effective 
corporate governance (CG) through sound risk management and reporting practices. This paper, 
therefore, examines the crucial question of whether the quality of firm-level CG has any effect on the 
quality and extent of corporate risk disclosures (CRD) in South Africa (SA) with particular focus on 
the pre- and post-2007/2008 global financial crisis period. Using one of the largest datasets to-date on 
CG and CRD, from 2002 to 2011, and distinctively drawing on a multiple theoretical perspective, we 
find that CRD are largely ‘non-financial’, ‘historical’, ‘good news’ and ‘qualitative’ in nature over the 
ten-year period investigated. We also find that block ownership and institutional ownership are 
negatively associated with the extent of CRD, whilst board diversity, board size and independent non-
executive directors are positively related to the extent of CRD. By contrast, dual board leadership 
structure has no significant connection with the extent of CRD. Our results are robust across a raft of 
econometric models that adequately address different types of endogeneity problems, as well as 
alternative CG and CRD proxies. Our findings are largely consistent with the predictions of our multi-
theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, legitimacy, institutional, resource-
dependence, and stakeholder theories.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Risk management and reporting, Multiple theoretical perspectives, 
2007/2008 global financial crisis, King reports and South Africa  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Major corporate collapses in the 1990s/2000s, particularly in the developed economies of Western Europe 
and North America, highlighted the need for good corporate governance (CG) through greater corporate 
accountability, social responsibility, sound risk management, transparency and disclosure practices (King 
Committee, 1994, 2002; Mallin, 2002; Iatridis, 2010). The 2007/2008 global financial crisis has reignited the 
debate and, in particular, the effectiveness of corporate risk management and disclosure practices (Walker Review, 
2009; Breitenfellner & Wagner, 2010; Iatridis, 2008, 2011). This paper, therefore, investigates the association 
between CG and risk reporting in the light of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, we utilise a natural 
and unique corporate setting in South Africa (SA), where recent CG disclosure policy reforms distinctively require 
corporations to provide more transparent information on a set of recommended good risk management practices to 
examine the motives for, and determinants of, corporate risk disclosures (CRD). 
 The past years have witnessed a surge of interest in the quality and extent of corporate risk practices (ASB, 
2009; ICAEW, 2011). This development is not only caused by the increased multi-level pressure from various 
external and internal corporate stakeholders, including regulators and investors (Berger & Gleibner, 2006; Linsley 
& Shrives, 2006), but is also due to the apparent strategic implications for maintaining long-term sustainable 
corporate operations (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Bhimani, 2009).1 In fact, as risk disclosure involves substantial costs 
relating to litigation, copyrights, competition, regulation and taxation (Lajili & Zeghal, 2005; Greco, 2012), it has 
been argued that in the absence of potential direct and indirect benefits rational managers will not voluntarily 
engage in CRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Hence, within this perspective, managers 
may engage in comprehensive CRD for a number of strategic motives/reasons.  
 First, increased commitment to transparency and accountability through CRD can minimise agency 
problems (Schrand, 1997; Rajgopal, 1999; Holm & Laursen, 2007) by reducing information asymmetry between 
managers and corporate stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rhodes & Soobaroyen, 2010), and thereby 
enhance performance. Second, from institutional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) and legitimacy 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995) theories’ perspective, engaging in greater transparency and disclosure 
practices through CRD can strategically enhance congruence of corporate goals and norms with those of society, 
which can facilitate sustainable corporate operations by improving corporate reputation and goodwill (King 
                                                 
1Indeed, widespread public perceptions and limited anecdotal evidence suggest that poor risk management and CRD practices partly contributed 
to the 2007/2008 financial crisis (the so called “credit crunch”) (SSG, 2009; Walker Review, 2009; Breitenfellner & Wagner, 2010; Pirson & 
Turnbull, 2011).  
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Committee, 1994, 2002). Third, stakeholder theory suggests that engaging in comprehensive CRD (Holm & 
Laursen, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012) can be an effective strategy to gain the support of 
influential corporate stakeholders, such as regulators, investors, government and employees (Freeman & Reed, 
1983; Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995), who may be important to a corporation’s ability to conduct 
economically viable operations (King Committee, 1994, 2002). Fourth, from a resource-dependence perspective, 
increased commitment to CRD (Oliveira et al., 2011; Pirson & Turnbull, 2011) can increase access to crucial 
resources, such as finance, by minimising capital and political costs through improved corporate image and 
reputation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). In short, greater commitment to transparent 
CRD practices could have significant investment (capital budgeting), financing (capital structure) and liquidity 
(working capital) implications by reducing agency and information asymmetry problems (Botosan, 1997; Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Brown et al., 2009).  
 While a number of prior studies have focused on the drivers of, and reasons for, the occurrence and extent 
of CRD (Meier et al., 1995; Solomon et al., 2000; Ahmed et al., 2004), they appear to suffer from a number of 
limitations. First, existing studies have mainly examined how general firm characteristics, such as size and industry, 
drive CRD (Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005; Berger & Gleibner, 2006; Raj & Handley-Schachler, 
2009). By contrast, and despite suggestions that corporate disclosure decisions, including CRD, are largely at the 
discretion of corporate owners and boards (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012), studies 
investigating how a company’s CG mechanisms may affect its CRD are generally scarce (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012), and particularly so in developing countries (West, 2000; Amran 
et al., 2009). This considerably limits our understanding of why and how CG mechanisms might promote or impede 
CRD. Second, most prior studies have focused narrowly on financial CRD, especially market risks (i.e., 
exchange/interest rates, and commodity/equity prices), financial derivatives/instruments, and credit risks (i.e., credit 
default) (Schrand, 1997; Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Rajgopal, 1999; Marshall & Weetman, 2008). In contrast, studies 
exploring non-financial CRD, such as business/operational and strategic risks, are generally rare (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2009).2 Third, existing CRD studies have mainly employed one 
year cross-sectional data (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et 
                                                 
2This is partly due to the general lack of a comprehensive CRD framework (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Abraham & Cox, 2007), broadly reflecting 
the piecemeal/patchy approach to regulating CRD by the various national and international regulatory and professional accounting bodies, such 
as the International Accounting Standards Board, Securities and Exchange Commission, and EU (ICAEW, 2011; Linsley, 2011), nevertheless, it 
inevitably limits our understanding of the determinants of, and motivations for, CRD. 
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al., 2011), with limited longitudinal analyses (Berger & Gleibner, 2006; Raj & Handley-Schachler, 2009; Greco, 
2012), and thereby limiting our understanding of CRD behaviour over time. Crucially, there is a growing criticism 
regarding inadequate empirical evidence, and a general lack of critical academic reflections, on CRD in the period 
leading to, during, and after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (Edkins, 2009; ASB, 2009; ICAEW, 2011; 
Linsley, 2011; Abraham et al., 2012). Finally, and despite the increasing evidence that employing a multiple 
theoretical framework provides a richer basis for understanding and explaining corporate disclosures, including 
CRD (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010; Oliveira et al., 2011), past studies are either ex-ante 
relying primarily on a single theoretical perspective (Amran et al., 2009; Edkins, 2009; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012) 
or are predominantly descriptive in nature (Meier et al., 1995; Marshall & Weetman, 2008; ASB, 2009).  
 Given this background, this study attempts to overcome the limitations of existing studies in a number of 
ways, and thereby extend, as well as make a number of new contributions to the extant CG and CRD literature. 
First, we seek to specifically examine the extent to which a company's CG mechanisms (i.e., in terms of ownership 
and board characteristics) may affect its CRD. This departs from most past studies that investigate how general 
company features, such as size and industry influence CRD. Our contention is that in a competitive and information 
asymmetric market, whereby CRD have significant financial and non-financial costs implications, better-governed 
corporations need to distinguish themselves by credibly signalling their good governance, accountability and 
transparency qualities. One way by which better-governed corporations can distinguish themselves is to commit to 
higher levels of CRD (Mallin, 2002; Beekes & Brown, 2006). Second, and unlike existing one year cross-sectional 
studies, our study explores CRD over a long and recent period (i.e., from 2002 to 2011), and thereby allows us to 
distinctively shed crucial and timely empirical insights on CRD in the pre- and post-2007/2008 global financial 
crisis period. Third, and distinct from most of the existing studies that have narrowly investigated financial CRD, 
we provide evidence regarding both financial and non-financial CRD. Finally, we examine the drivers of CRD from 
multiple theoretical perspectives. Given the different motivations for CRD (Amran et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 
2011), the study is distinguished from previous studies by its ex-ante exploration of a number of theoretical 
perspectives, including agency, institutional, legitimacy, resource-dependence and stakeholder theories, as 
providing the likely basis for understanding and explaining CRD in the particular context of SA. 
As will be discussed further, SA provides an interesting and natural context where CRD can be studied. 
Following the collapse of apartheid in 1994, and similar to other Anglo-American countries, SA has pursued CG 
policy reforms in the form of the King Reports (King Committee, 1994, 2002). Distinct from other Anglo-Saxon 
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countries, however, the reforms require firms to provide more transparent information on a set of recommended 
good risk management practices (Ntim et al., 2011, 2012). As such, our study context, allows us to explicitly 
investigate whether a company’s CG structures affect its CRD practices, as well as the various motives that may 
influence such disclosures.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses CG and the risk reporting 
policy reforms pursued in SA. The following sections present a multi-theoretical framework for corporate risk 
disclosures, discuss the CG and CRD literature, outline our research design, and present the empirical analyses, 
with the concluding remarks containing a summary and a brief discussion of policy implications. 
 
2. Corporate governance, risk reporting and the South African corporate context 
 
 A considerable number of global corporate failures in the 1990s/2000s emphasised the relevance of good 
CG, accountability, risk management, social responsibility, accounting transparency and disclosure practices (King 
Committee, 1994, 2002; Mallin, 2002). Consequently, CG policy reforms have been pursued in a large number of 
countries (see Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). It may be observed that such CG reforms, especially those 
implemented in Anglo-Saxon countries have predominantly focused narrowly on financial aspects (Ntim et al., 
2011, 2012). However, CG reforms carried out in SA have explicitly focused broadly on both financial and non-
financial aspects of CG, including risk management and reporting (Ntim et al., 2011). Arguably, this creates a 
natural and unique context, whereby the connection between CG and CRD can be investigated.  
Formal attempts at enhancing CG practices in SA corporations began in 1994 with the King I report, but 
while the proposals were observably similar to those of other Anglo-American countries, the report distinctively 
focused on both financial (shareholder) and non-financial (stakeholder) aspects, particularly regarding the 
environment, health, safety and affirmative action  (Ntim et al., 2011, 2012). However, and crucially, King I failed 
to explicitly make recommendations relating to sound corporate risk management and reporting practices (King 
Committee, 1994, 2002). Consequently, King I was revised and replaced with a second King Report (King II) in 
2002. Similar to King I, King II focused on governing the firm in the broader interests of both shareholders and 
stakeholders, but distinct from King I, it placed special emphasis on the need for sound and robust risk management 
and reporting practices (King Committee, 2002; Ntim, et al., 2012). Specifically, it provided explicit guidance in 
three main areas of risk management: definition, identification, and classification of risks; risk governance 
structure; and application and risk reporting.  
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In terms of risk definition, King II defined risk as “uncertain future events that could influence the 
achievement of a company’s objectives” (King Committee, 2002, p.30)3, and broadly classified risks into financial 
and non-financial (see Appendix 1). Financial risk is defined generally as possible losses in the financial markets, 
which are largely internal and monetary in nature with direct and immediate effects on corporate assets and 
liabilities on the balance sheet. More precisely, these include: market risk arising from adverse changes in 
interest/exchange rates; and commodity/equity prices; as well as financial instruments/derivatives; credit/default 
risk; liquidity risk; and capital adequacy/insolvency risk. By contrast, non-financial risks are external and non-
monetary in nature involving indirect and longer-term effects on corporate assets and liabilities. In this respect, 
King II identified two main types of non-financial risks: (i) business/operational, referring to internal day-to-day 
decisions and risks that a company willingly assumes in order to create a competitive advantage and generate value 
for shareholders, including those relating to compliance, goodwill/reputation and legal aspects, amongst others; and 
(ii) strategic, referring to risks arising from basic changes in the external macro-economic environment, including 
GDP, inflation rate, money supply, as well as natural disasters, amongst others (see Appendix 1 for the full list).  
 With particular respect to risk governance, King II indicated that a company’s board is responsible for the 
total process of risk management, as well as for forming its own opinion on the effectiveness of the process. In 
contrast, a company’s management is accountable to the board for designing, implementing and monitoring the 
process of risk management and integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the company. Specifically, King II 
recommended that a risk management committee, consisting of executive and non-executive directors and chaired 
by an independent non-executive director, be set-up by the board to continuously review the risk management 
process; although overall responsibility for risk management should remain with the board.  
 Finally, and with respect to risk application and reporting, King II suggested that a comprehensive system 
of internal control should be established by the board to ensure that all risks are mitigated. Specifically, it 
recommended that risks should be assessed on an on-going basis and control activities should be designed to 
respond to risks throughout the company at all levels. Furthermore, a board must identify key risks areas and key 
performance indicators of the company, and monitor these factors as part of a regular review of processes and 
procedures in order to enhance the effectiveness of its internal systems of control. Crucially, King II required the 
board to comprehensively report/disclose in the annual report the following: (i) risk management policies; (ii) the 
                                                 
3We note that this definition is largely consistent with that of Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.402), who define risk broadly as “any opportunity or 
prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in 
the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, or threat or exposure”.   
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process for identifying, evaluating and managing significant risks faced by the company; (iii) contingency plans for 
handling and preventing disastrous incidents from impacting on operations; (iv) the system of internal control and 
audit; (v) the internal system of risk reporting/communicating; and (vi) a statement that the board is accountable for 
the effectiveness of the overall process of risk management and the system of internal control. 
While the pursuit of  joint CG and CRD reforms in SA, contrasts with the experience in most Anglo-Saxon 
countries, but is similar to that in a number of Asian and continental European countries, the SA situation is also 
characterised by highly concentrated corporate ownership structure (Ntim et al., 2012). Distinct from most Asian 
and European countries, however, is that the ownership concentration is due to the existence of tall pyramids and 
complex cross-shareholdings by a few very large companies (King Committee, 2002).4 Additionally, activism by 
shareholders, including institutional ones, is noticeably weak with the SA experience further characterised by poor 
record of implementing and enforcing corporate regulations (King Committee, 2002). In sum, these contextual 
issues seem to have significantly impaired the effectiveness of the market for corporate and managerial control in 
SA (Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012).  
Thus, and in summary, although SA has arguably and uniquely pursued a combination of CG and CRD 
reforms compared with other Anglo-American countries, critical concerns have been raised as to whether a 
voluntary compliance regime like King II, can effectively improve CG and CRD standards. It is in this context that 
we seek to examine the association between CG and CRD. 
 
3. A multi-theoretical framework for corporate risk disclosures (CRD) 
 
 Although corporate and academic interest in CRD has gradually increased in recent years (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Pirson & Turnbull, 2011), a comprehensive and uniform theoretical 
framework for investigating and explaining corporate motivations for engaging in it is yet to emerge (Deegan, 
2002; Raj & Handley-Schachler, 2009). Currently, extant studies have tended to rely on different socio-political 
(i.e., institutional, legitimacy, and stakeholder) and economic (i.e., agency and resource-dependence) theories 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Whereas individual socio-
political and economic theories have generally been useful in explaining the motivations for CRD (Amran et al., 
                                                 
4For example, the six largest pyramidical groups (namely, the Anglo American-De Beers, Rembrandt, Sanlam, Old Mutual, Liberty Life 
Insurance and Anglovaal Groups) control over 70% of the value of all stocks listed on the SA stock market, with the Anglo American-De Beers 
Group controlling 17 of the 20 largest quoted firms (Ntim et al., 2011). 
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2009; Greco, 2012), they have been limited in their individual ability to completely explain the various motivations 
influencing different CRD practices (Reverte, 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011).  
 Agency theory views the corporation as a nexus of contracts between utility maximising economic agents 
operating in efficient markets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this setting, CRD may, for example, be relevant to 
investors in making investment, risk and return decisions (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Greco, 2012) by reducing 
information asymmetry between financial stakeholders (Ahmed et al., 2004; Rhodes & Soobaroyen, 2010). 
However, the relevance of agency theory in explaining the motivations for CRD has been suggested to be impaired 
because it predominantly directs CRD towards opportunistic financial agents, but who are apparently not the only 
beneficiaries of CRD (Gray et al., 1995; Abraham & Cox, 2007). 
Resource-dependence theory suggests that companies that commit to high levels of transparency in the 
form of increased CRD can enjoy unique competitive advantages by gaining access to critical resources, such as 
finance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). Indeed, since it is costly to engage in CRD (in 
terms of financial, legal, proprietary, competition, regulation and taxation) issues (Lajili & Zeghal, 2005; Greco, 
2012), benefits may accrue to the firm in the form of enhanced internal risk management, management expertise, 
corporate image and reputation (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), as well as a cheaper cost 
of capital (Botosan, 1997; Mallin, 2002). However, resource-dependence theory has been criticised for indicating 
that CRD should be conducted primarily for corporate strategic motives instead of exhibiting responsibility and 
accountability to a broader range of corporate stakeholders (Parker, 2005; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007).  
Legitimacy theory and institutional theory both focus on the ability of the firm to achieve social 
acceptance (Deegan, 2002; Chen & Roberts, 2010). The former suggests that a firm’s right to exist is legitimised if 
its value system is consistent with that of the larger social system of which it is part of, but threatened when there is 
actual or potential conflict between the two value systems (Asforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). Similarly, 
institutional theory indicates that firms tend to incorporate external norms and rules into their operations and 
structures in order to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). Thus, it can be argued that 
companies can gain social acceptance and legitimise their operations by engaging in CRD. Despite being very 
useful in explaining motivations for CRD (Edkins, 2009; Raj & Handley-Schachler, 2009), both theories are 
hindered by a number of weaknesses. These include vagueness regarding the identity of corporate stakeholders, 
prioritising financial stakeholders and limited capacity to predict and explain managerial behaviour (Gray et al., 
1995; Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005). 
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Finally, and closely related to legitimacy theory, the managerial stakeholder theory considers CRD as a 
tool used by corporations to manage or manipulate the informational needs of their various powerful stakeholders, 
such as shareholders, employees and government, in order to gain their approval, which is crucial for their survival 
(Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984). In this case, stakeholder theory is similar to or overlaps with legitimacy 
theory, but they are distinguished by the degree of resolution (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Deegan, 2002), whereby 
legitimacy theory refers to a macro level social contract between a corporation and the larger society, and thus, the 
firm receives its legitimacy to exist from the society in general. In contrast, stakeholder theory provides a more 
refined resolution by identifying and referring to specific powerful stakeholders within the larger society, and 
hence, it is the identified stakeholders that confer legitimacy on a corporation (Gray et al., 1995; Reverte, 2009). In 
spite of its usefulness in explaining the motivations for CRD (Linsley et al., 2006; Amran et al., 2009; Oliveira et 
al., 2011), stakeholder theory has been criticised for directing CRD at the most powerful and influential 
stakeholders, of which the majority are financial stakeholders, and thereby pandering CRD to corporate self-
interests (Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005). 
 As the preceding suggests, there are clear limitations in each individual theoretical perspective’s ability to 
explain CRD, and given the diversity in corporate motivations for CRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Cabedo & 
Tirado, 2004), we instead adopt a multi-theoretical framework.5 Following prior suggestions (Gray et al., 1995; 
Deegan, 2002), as well as recent evidence (Amran et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011), we consider the range of 
individual approaches to be complementary rather than competing theories. Given the interdependencies or 
overlaps among the five theories, we argue that a combined consideration will provide a richer basis for 
understanding and explaining the motivations for CRD within the SA context.  
 
4. Prior studies: Corporate risk disclosures, corporate governance and hypotheses development 
 
 Past studies (Meier et al., 1995; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012) have identified a number of variables that can affect CRD. This study draws 
from this, the CG (Beekes & Brown, 2006; Ntim et al., 2011; Bozec & Bozec, 2012), the voluntary disclosure (Eng 
& Mak, 2003; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Barako et al., 2006), and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Gray et 
al., 1995; Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005; Reverte, 2009; Fifka, 2012) literature, as well as the SA corporate setting 
                                                 
5We are, however, conscious of incompatibility problems that may arise when different theories are combined (Reverte, 2009; Oliveira et al., 
2011). Therefore, as a multi-theoretical framework is expected to focus on common key concepts (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Roberts, 
2010), agency, institutional, legitimacy, resource-dependence and stakeholder theories were selected on the basis of the commonality of their 
core concepts. Also, given the diverse nature of CRD, covering financial (market, liquidity, and credit) and non-financial (business/operational 
and strategic) risks, we consider it to be appropriate to adopt a multi-theoretical framework, whereby some theories may be more applicable in 
explaining certain CRD than others.   
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(Ntim et al., 2011, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012), to identify possible drivers of CRD. Distinct from most prior 
studies, we explore how firm-level CG quality in the form of ownership mechanisms (i.e., government ownership, 
block ownership and institutional ownership) and board characteristics (i.e., board diversity, board size, 
independent non-executive directors, and board leadership structure) drive CRD. Following past studies, we also 
investigate how general firm characteristics, including audit firm size, capital expenditure, the presence of CG and 
CSR committees, cross-listing, firm size, leverage, industry, profitability, sales growth and year, influence CRD.    
 
4.1. Corporate governance: Corporate ownership mechanisms  
Given the ruling SA government’s formal commitment to the recommendations of King II relating to CRD 
(Ntim et al., 2011, 2012), our expectation is that SA companies with high government ownership will actively seek 
to win government support as a powerful stakeholder (stakeholder theory) (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; 
Gray et al., 1995) by complying with the King II rules (institutional theory) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 
1987) through either substantive and/or symbolic CRD that may not only help in legitimising (legitimacy theory) 
their operations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), but also secure access to critical resources (resource-
dependence theory) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006),  such as finance that can enhance 
performance.  
While agency theory suggests that increased CRD practices can help resolve agency problems between 
managers and government as an influential shareholder (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rhodes & Soobaroyen, 2010), 
some studies contrastingly view government ownership as exacerbating agency problems (agency theory) by 
impairing the effectiveness of internal managerial monitoring, including disclosure practices (Jia et al., 2009; Hou 
& Moore, 2010). For example, Hou and Moore (2010) report that the incidence of corruption and fraud is high 
(low) in Chinese firms with high (low) government ownership. On the other hand, they find that incidence of 
enforcement action by the regulatory authorities in response to corruption and fraud is low (high) in Chinese firms 
with high (low) government ownership. This implies that strong political connection associated with high levels of 
government ownership provides protection against greater scrutiny and discipline by weak regulatory authorities 
and corrupt public officials, and thereby leading to poor disclosure practices in such firms. However, through the 
Public Investment Commission (PIC), the SA government maintains strategic, but relatively low ownership stakes 
in large public corporations with the aim of encouraging CG, CSR, disclosure, growth, employment and 
redistribution (Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012). Most of these economic and political goals tend to be 
in direct conflict with the profit maximising objectives of private investors. Previous studies suggest that the greater 
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the degree of such conflicts among powerful stakeholders (stakeholder theory), such as government and private 
owners, the higher the need for resolution through increased disclosure, including CRD (Eng & Mak, 2003; Dam & 
Scholtens, 2012). 
Prior empirical studies regarding the connection between government ownership and voluntary disclosure 
is limited, thereby making it a fertile area for further research, especially in SA where there is a clear dearth of CRD 
studies. Consistent with the conflicting theoretical predictions, the findings of past studies are mixed. For example, 
whereas Eng and Mak (2003), Ntim et al. (2011), Khan et al. (2012), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) find that 
government ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosure, Dam and Scholtens (2012) report that 
government ownership is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. Despite the mixed findings, and given 
the specific role of the PIC, the SA government can be viewed as having relatively low, but strategic ownership 
stakes in large corporations with an explicit interest in encouraging good governance, social responsibility, 
transparency, and disclosure practices, including CRD (Ntim et al., 2012) and, hence, our first hypothesis is that: 
H1:  There is a statistically significant positive association between government ownership and the  
              extent of corporate risk disclosures. 
 
Agency theory indicates that increased managerial monitoring and reduced information asymmetry 
associated with concentrated ownership can be expected to minimise agency problems and improve performance 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Greco, 2012), and, as such, a reduced need for CRD (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Raj & 
Handley-Schachler, 2009). That is, the need for public accountability through disclosure tends to be less in closely-
held firms due to low outsider interests (Khan et al., 2012). Therefore, it appears that managers of firms with 
concentrated ownership structure are less likely to engage in disclosure because the costs of CRD (i.e., competition, 
litigation, and regulation) may be greater than its potential benefits (i.e., reduction in information asymmetry). In 
contrast, diffused ownership requires increased monitoring, which can be reduced through greater CRD (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Oliveira et al., 2011). Where ownership is comparatively dispersed, a lack of disclosure can lead to 
information asymmetry between managers and owners, which can impact negatively on valuation. As such, 
discretionary disclosure, therefore, provides managers with opportunities to reduce such conflicts by engaging in 
comprehensive voluntary disclosure, including CRD.  
Empirically, the findings of previous studies are largely consistent with the view that concentrated 
ownership structures leads to less voluntary disclosure compared with the dispersed alternative (Eng & Mak, 2003; 
Barako et al., 2006). For example, Reverte (2009), Khan et al. (2012), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) report that 
closely-held firms disclose significantly less information on their CSR practices.  Noticeably, empirical studies 
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examining the relationship between block ownership and CRD are scarce, with those by Lopes and Rodrigues 
(2007) and Oliveira et al. (2011) being rare exceptions. Both studies find that concentrated ownership has a 
negative effect on CRD. With specific reference to the SA context, corporate ownership has typically been 
dominated by a limited number of very large companies, mainly via complex cross-holdings and pyramidical 
structures (Ntim et al., 2011, 2012) and, thus, our prediction is that block ownership will affect CRD. However, 
public accountability and interests in such firms is relatively limited (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012) and therefore, we 
expect such firms to engage in low voluntary disclosures, including CRD. Thus, our second hypothesis is that: 
H2:  There is a statistically significant negative association between block ownership and the extent  
 of corporate risk disclosures.  
 
Agency theory suggests that due to their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders have extra 
incentive to closely monitor corporate disclosures (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Hence, 
managers will not only be expected to make more disclosures, including CRD ones, to meet the informational 
needs of institutional shareholders as powerful corporate stakeholders (stakeholder theory) (Amran et al., 2009; 
Abraham et al., 2012), but also to secure their support in order to legitimise (institutional and legitimacy theories) 
or justify their continued stewardship of the company and its resources (Edkins, 2009; Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
Thus, institutional shareholders can be considered as delegated monitors (agency and stakeholder theories) as they 
invest largely on behalf of ultimate shareholders, such as employees and pensioners. The primary objective of such 
investments is to create value for shareholders, and therefore, institutional shareholders tend to be keenly interested 
in CG, performance, and disclosure issues (Dam & Scholtens, 2012). Furthermore, because institutional 
shareholders often own a substantial proportion of a firm’s shares, which cannot be easily sold, they are likely to be 
more interested in the firm’s strategic decisions, such as investment and disclosure, than small investors. 
Empirically, a number of studies have examined the association between institutional ownership and 
voluntary disclosure (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Fifka, 2012). For instance, Barako et al. (2006) and Ntim et al. 
(2011) report that voluntary disclosure is high in firms with high institutional ownership. Similarly, Dam and 
Scholtens (2012), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) find that institutional ownership leads to high CSR disclosures. 
Past studies investigating a direct link between institutional ownership and CRD are, however, limited. In this case, 
studies by Abraham and Cox (2007), and Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) are rare exceptions, with both finding that 
institutional ownership is positively related to CRD. As already noted in the SA context, the pervasive institutional 
ownership, largely in the form of pyramidical structures and complex cross-shareholdings (Ntim et al., 2011, 2012), 
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means that institutional ownership is likely to be an important driver of CRD. Given that King II urges institutional 
shareholders to actively seek to enhance disclosure practices in SA firms and, thus, our third hypothesis is that: 
H3:  There is a statistically significant positive association between institutional ownership and the 
extent of corporate risk disclosures.  
 
4.2. Corporate governance: Corporate board characteristic variables 
 Generally, board diversity refers to the various features that may be present among directors that can affect 
decision-making (Carter et al., 2003; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). These characteristics include those that are 
directly observable (e.g., age, ethnicity, and gender) and those that are less visible (e.g., education, occupation, and 
religion) (Mahadeo et al., 2012). In this study, given that the King reports place special emphasis on board diversity 
on the basis of ethnicity and gender (King Committee, 1994, 2002), our investigation focuses mainly on ethnic and 
gender aspects of board diversity. Resource-dependence theory indicates that boards of diverse gender and ethnic 
backgrounds can help connect a company to its external environment and obtain resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Oliveira et al., 2011), as well as enhance corporate legitimacy (legitimacy and institutional theories) (Scott, 
1987; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Edkins, 2009). Agency theory also suggests that boards of diverse ethnic and 
gender backgrounds can improve board independence and enhance managerial monitoring (Cabedo & Tirado, 
2004; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Similarly, stakeholder theory suggests that corporate boards of diverse 
backgrounds can help provide a better link with stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Amran et al., 2009), 
which can further enhance growth opportunities.  
 Although a number of empirical studies suggest that board diversity has a positive effect on a number of 
corporate outcomes (Carter et al., 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012), evidence regarding the impact of board diversity on 
voluntary disclosures, such as CRD is scarce. For example, Carter et al. (2003) and Mahadeo et al. (2012) find that 
financial performance is higher in firms with boards formed by members from diverse ethnic and gender 
backgrounds than their homogenous counterparts. Similarly, Barako and Brown (2008), and Ntim et al. (2011) 
report that board diversity is positively related to voluntary disclosure, whereas Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) find 
that CSR reporting is higher in firms with more diverse boards than their less diverse counterparts. Within the SA 
context, post-apartheid affirmative action regulations in the form of the 1998 employment equity (EE) and 2003 
black economic empowerment (BEE) laws expect corporate boards, to be diverse in order to reflect the ethnic and 
gender composition of the SA populace. For example, the 2003 BEE act requires membership of senior 
management, including corporate boards to be formed by about 40% to 50% non-whites. Further, although King II 
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does not set any specific diversity targets for firms, it suggests that every company should consider whether its 
board is diverse enough in terms of skills and demographics (i.e., ethnicity and gender). It also encourages firms to 
comply with the provisions of the BEE and EE acts, thus indicating that King II expects board diversity to impact 
positively on corporate outcomes, including performance and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, given that the extent 
of CRD is largely a managerial discretion, our expectation is that diverse boards are more likely to put pressure 
(especially from black and female members) on senior managers to engage in greater CRD. Thus, our fourth 
hypothesis is that:  
H4:  There is a statistically significant positive association between board diversity on the basis of  
 ethnicity and gender, and the extent of corporate risk disclosures. 
 
Agency theory indicates that increased managerial monitoring associated with larger boards can have a 
positive influence on corporate disclosures, including CRD and performance (Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012). Similarly, stakeholder theory suggests that larger boards offer greater access to their firm’s 
external environment, which reduces uncertainties and also facilitates the securing of critical resources, such as 
finance and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009). Also, resource-dependence theory indicates that larger boards 
enhance the knowledge base on which business advice can be sought, which increases managerial ability to make 
important and better business decisions (Hou & Moore, 2010). Furthermore, the theory indicates that larger boards 
are associated with greater diversity in terms of expertise (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Shrives et al., 2006), 
experience, and stakeholder (stakeholder theory) representation (Freeman, 1984; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005), which can 
enhance corporate legitimacy (institutional and legitimacy theories) and reputation (Suchman, 1995; Raj & 
Handley-Schachler, 2009). A contrary theoretical proposition from agency theory is that larger boards are bad, 
while smaller boards are good and effective at improving corporate performance and disclosure (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Specifically, Jensen (1993) suggests that larger boards are often characterised by poor co-
ordination, communication and monitoring, as well as greater director free-riding, which can impact negatively on 
CRD and performance. In contrast, smaller boards are often associated with frequent candid and effective 
discussions that can have a positive effect on performance and disclosure. 
A number of studies have investigated the impact of board size on corporate performance and disclosure 
with conflicting findings (Beiner et al., 2006; Jia et al., 2009; Hou & Moore, 2010; Fifka, 2012). For instance, 
Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008) find that board size is positively related to firm value, whilst Coles et al. 
(2008) and Guest (2009) report a negative link between board size and performance. Similarly, Jia et al. (2009) find 
that the incidence of corruption and fraud in Chinese firms with larger boards is higher than in their smaller 
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counterparts, implying that larger boards are poor at monitoring managers. In contrast, Hou and Moore (2010) 
report that board size has a negative effect on the incidence of fraud in China, suggesting that greater monitoring 
power associated with larger boards can minimise the extent of managerial corruption and fraud. Further, Ntim et 
al. (2011), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) report that firms with larger boards disclose more information on their 
CG and CSR practices, respectively. Of closer relevance to our study, Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) find that board 
size has a positive effect on CRD.6 With specific reference to the SA setting, King II does not specify the number of 
directors that a board should have, but suggests that every board must consider whether its size makes it effective; 
indicating that board size is considered as a crucial CG structure that can influence CRD. Given the mixed 
theoretical and empirical literature, however, our fifth hypothesis is that: 
H5:  There is a statistically significant association between board size and the extent of corporate  
 risk disclosures.  
 
Legitimacy theory indicates that there is a perception of the existence of a legitimacy gap in modern 
companies, in which ownership is distinct from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993), which can be 
resolved by selecting independent non-executive directors (INED) to represent corporate stakeholders (Freeman & 
Reed, 1983; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Thus, the appointment of INED can be viewed as an attempt to enhance 
corporate legitimacy by signalling a match between corporate and societal values (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Edkins, 
2009). Similarly, agency and stakeholder theories suggest that the presence of INED can be viewed as an important 
CG structure, not only to resolve agency problems between managers and shareholders (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Oliveira et al., 2011), but also to advance the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees and local 
communities (Amran et al., 2009; Chen & Roberts, 2010). In this case, INED are viewed as offering the necessary 
checks and balances required to improve the effectiveness of a board in advising, monitoring and disciplining top 
management. Moreover, the increased independence and accountability associated with INED suggests that their 
presence may enhance corporate response to stakeholder concerns relating to CRD (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; 
Pirson & Turnbull, 2011). As such, INED are viewed as more able to respect and honour the obligations of the firm 
and are generally keener in encouraging greater transparency and voluntary disclosure, as doing so may improve 
their personal prestige and social standing (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Further, INED normally have limited 
involvement in the day-to-day running of the firm, but tend to be exposed to higher levels of risk in terms of their 
                                                 
6We note that a number of studies suggest a non-linear relationship between board size and performance (Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009). 
Similarly, other studies indicate that block ownership and institutional ownership are non-monotonically related to performance (Morck et al., 
1988; Beiner et al., 2006). Thus, the relationship between these variables and CRD may be curvi-linear, and as such, we investigate a non-linear 
relationship between the three variables and CRD, as part of our additional analyses. We are also grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this 
suggestion. 
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personal reputation (Oliveira et al., 2011). Therefore, INED have greater incentives to demand greater transparency 
and disclosure from top management in order to balance the high risk to their personal reputation (Lopes & 
Rodrigues, 2007). 
Empirically, and consistent with the theoretical predictions, a large number of studies report that INED 
have a positive effect on a number of different corporate outcomes, such as performance (Beiner et al., 2006; 
Henry, 2008; Mahadeo et al., 2012), voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 
2011), CSR disclosure (Barako & Brown, 2008; Khan et al., 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2012), reducing the incidence of corruption and fraud (Jia et al., 2009; Hou & Moore, 2010), and risk 
disclosure (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). 
With regard to the SA setting, King II requires corporate boards of directors to be formed by a majority of INED, 
indicating that the presence of INED is generally viewed as a positive development, with potential positive 
implications for performance and disclosure, including CRD. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is that: 
H6:  There is a statistically significant positive association between the percentage of INED and the 
extent of corporate risk disclosures.  
 
An important CG issue is corporate board leadership structure. A dual board leadership structure (DBLS) 
refers to a situation whereby the roles of the chief executive officer (CEO – management) and chairman (control) of 
the board are performed by different individuals. The chairman of the board is responsible for managing the board. 
These may typically include nominating new board members, reviewing the performance of senior management, 
setting agenda for board meetings, and settling conflicts which may arise within the board (Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012). In contrast, the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day management of the company, including implementing 
board decisions. A number of alternative theories (e.g., agency, resource-dependence and stakeholder theories) 
suggest that DBLS can have a positive effect on corporate performance and disclosure (Freeman, 1984; Jensen, 
1993; Reverte, 2009). For example, agency theory suggests that separating the board chairperson and CEO 
positions can substantially enhance the board’s capacity to monitor and discipline managers by improving board 
accountability and independence (Barako et al., 2006), which can have a positive effect on CRD. Resource-
dependence theory indicates that DBLS does not only expand corporate access to resources, such as executive talent 
and experience (Henry, 2008; Bozec & Bozec, 2012), but also improves legitimacy (legitimacy theory) and 
stakeholder representation (stakeholder theory) by signifying greater democracy in executive decision-making 
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(Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012), as well as signalling managerial willingness to commit to high levels of transparency 
and accountability (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012).  
By contrast, a number of other studies suggest that role duality (i.e., combining the roles of CEO and 
Chairman) leads to better corporate outcomes (Khan et al., 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). For instance, 
employment of resource-dependence theory indicates that as an insider, the CEO tends to have greater knowledge, 
understanding and experience of the strategic challenges and opportunities, which the company faces, than a non-
executive chairman; impacting positively on performance (Barako et al., 2006; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). 
Similarly, agency theory indicates that role duality grants a charismatic CEO the opportunity to have a sharper 
focus on firm objectives, thereby allowing a visionary CEO the opportunity to shape the long-term fortunes of a 
firm with minimum board interference (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). This may lead to improved performance 
due to the rapid management decision-making that arises from the provision of clear and unambiguous corporate 
leadership. Agency theory further suggests that unified firm leadership often associated with role duality improves 
managerial accountability as it makes it easier to charge the blame for poor performance (Khan et al., 2012; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).  
Empirically, past evidence largely suggests that DBLS (CEO role duality) has a positive (negative) effect 
on different corporate outcomes. For example, Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008) find that corporate financial 
performance is higher in firms with DBLS than those with CEO role duality, whilst Barako et al. (2006) report a 
positive relationship between DBLS and voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Khan et al. (2012), Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2012), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) find that DBLS leads to higher CSR disclosures. Of direct 
importance to our study, Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) report that DBLS has a positive effect on CRD. With 
respect to the SA context, King II explicitly encourages SA companies to adopt DBLS in order to enhance corporate 
disclosure and performance and, therefore, our final hypothesis is that: 
H7:  There is a statistically significant positive association between dual board leadership  
 structure and the extent of corporate risk disclosures. 
 
 
5. Research design 
 
5.1. Data considerations 
 Our sample is based on all 169 non-financial companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
with full data from 2002 to 2011, selected from 5 main industries: basic materials; consumer goods; consumer 
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services; industrials; and technology/telecoms.7 As the findings of past studies suggest that company size and 
industry influence CG and CRD (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim 
et al., 2012), we chose the largest 10 companies from each of the five industries based on their market capitalisation 
in order to control for size and industry. Thus, our final sample was made up of 50 companies over 10 firm-years, 
resulting in a total of 500 firm-year observations from five industries for our regression analyses.8 The CG and 
CRD variables were collected from the sampled corporations’ annual reports downloaded from the Perfect 
Information Database, whereas the financial variables were collected from DataStream.  
   
5.2. Definition of variables and model specification 
 We classify our variables into three main types, with full definitions and mnemonics presented in 
Appendix 1 and Table 1. In order to test H1 to H7, our main dependent variables are the summary CRD scores – 
CRDS (CRDI), which seek to measure the quantity/volume (quality/level) of CRD in three major areas as set out by 
King II, comprising of: (i) financial (CFRDS/CFRDI); (ii) operational/business (CORDS/CORDI); and (iii) 
strategic (CRDS/CSRDI) corporate risk disclosures. This constitutes one of the largest CRD datasets to be used to-
date and we utilise the widely used content analysis method of codifying written ‘texts’, ‘numbers/tables’ and 
‘graphs/pictures’ into various categories to collect all our CRD data (see Krippendorff, 1980, 2004; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Unerman, 2000; Beattie & Thompson, 2007; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011).  
                                                 
7Our sample excludes companies from financial and utilities sectors, which are (i) subject to heavy regulations, (ii) highly geared in terms of 
capital structure, and (iii) inherently risk management entities; characteristics which can impact differently on their performance, CRD and CG 
structures, and should, therefore, be studied independently (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006). The exclusion of financials/utilities 
also facilitates direct comparisons to be drawn with the findings of previous studies (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Amran et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 
2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012), which also excluded such companies. Thus, and following previous studies (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Abraham & Cox, 2007; Greco, 2012), we limit our sample to 291 non-financials out of a total of 402 JSE listed companies. Our sample begins 
from 2002 because King II became operational in 2002. Our sample ends in 2011 because: (i) it was the latest year for which data is available, 
and (ii) we are interested in longitudinal behaviour of CRD, including the years before and after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. However, 
and to ensure consistency in the longitudinal analysis, we included only companies with the full data needed from 2002 to 2011 inclusive. 
Twenty-eight and 94 companies had no and incomplete data, respectively. Finally, the extensiveness of the CG and CRD data, coupled with the 
labour intensive nature of manual collection limited our final sample to 50 out of the 169 companies with full data based on firm size and 
industry.   
8Our sample selection criteria were set for a number of reasons. First, following previous studies (Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012), the criteria ensured that the conditions for a balanced panel analysis were met. Some of the statistical benefits for using panel data include 
having both time-series and cross-sectional observations, and less multicollinearity among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). 
Second, investigation of a ten-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may be helpful in ascertaining whether the observed 
cross-sectional connection between CG and CRD holds over-time. A potential weakness of our sample selection criteria is that it may introduce 
survivorship bias into the sample selection process. However, the criteria generated a reasonable number of observations and thus, 
generalisability of the results of our study should arguably not be seriously impaired by our sample selection criteria. To be certain, however, we 
further investigated this potential problem by following Beiner et al. (2006) and compare the characteristics of our final 50 sampled firms to 
those of the 263 firms out of the initial 291 firms with at least one year’s financial data available rather than the complete ten years. Specifically, 
we test for equality in means and medians of all our financial variables, including capital expenditure, firm size, leverage, operating profit and 
sales growth, between our final balanced sample of 50 firms and the unbalanced sample of 263 firms. If the two groups display similar features, 
then we can conclude that our final sample is representative of the underlying population. The results (which for brevity are not reported, but 
available upon request) indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in the mean or median values for all the variables. We 
interpret this observation as suggesting that the characteristics of our final 50 sampled firms are largely similar to the underlying population and 
that our findings are not likely to be seriously affected by survivorship bias. 
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 As presented in Appendix 1, and given the well articulated limitations of quantity measures, such as word, 
and sentence counts (Unerman, 2000; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Hooks & Van Staden, 
2011) and qualitative proxies, such as disclosure indices (Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Ntim et al., 2011, 2012), we use 
both in order to improve the robustness of our results. Specifically, we employ sentence count as our unit of 
measurement for a number of reasons.  First, and as discussed in previous studies (Unerman, 2000; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Linsley & Shrives, 2006), although words can arguably be counted with a high degree of accuracy and 
objectivity, they cannot be coded without reference to the underlying sentence, and using sentences thus minimises 
incidences of coding non-risk disclosures. Second, empirical studies (e.g., Hackston & Milne, 1996; Beattie & 
Thomson, 2007; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011) suggest that sentences provide complete, reliable and meaningful data 
for analysis. Third, the use of sentence is a well-established line of coding risk disclosures, which has been 
employed extensively by past studies (Lajili & Zegal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Amran et al., 2009; Raj & 
Handley-Schachler, 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Greco, 2012), and can also facilitate 
direct comparisons to be drawn with the findings of previous studies.  
 As previously discussed, we adopt the broad definition of risk offered by King II and Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) to identify, classify and code the risk disclosures. This involves a number of steps. First, sentences were 
coded as risk disclosures if the reader is reasonably informed (i.e., based on reading) of “any opportunity or 
prospect, or of any hazard, danger, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact 
upon the company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or 
exposure” (Linsley & Shrives, 2006, p.402). However, as suggested by Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), risk 
disclosures should be stated explicitly rather than implicitly. As such, any disclosure that was too vague to be 
classified as a risk disclosure was not coded. Therefore, every part of the annual reports were searched for risk 
disclosures although a good number of our sampled firms devoted separate sections of their reports for risk 
management and reporting, often as part of the CG report. Second, and based on King II, the risk disclosures (CRD) 
were classified into three main categories: financial (CFRD); operational/business (CORD) (non-financial); and 
strategic (CSRD) (non-financial) (see Appendix 1). Third, following past studies (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2011), the risk 
disclosures were further classified along the following dimensions (see Table 3): past/future, bad/negative, 
good/positive, qualitative/non-monetary, and quantitative/monetary information. The risk disclosures were also 
classified according to the three main disclosure formats (see Table 4): texts (TXT); numbers/tables (N/T); and 
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graphs/pictures (G/P). Fourth, with respect to the quantity measures (CRDS, CFRDS, CORDS, and CSRDS) (see 
Table 2), we counted the total number of risk disclosures in sentences along both the three main categories and the 
various dimensions. In terms of the quality measures (CRDI, CFRDI, CORDI, and CSRDI) (see Appendix 1), the 
risk disclosure sentences were coded on a scale of ‘0’ to ‘6’, whereby ‘0’ referred to ‘no risk disclosure information 
is contained’ and ‘6’ implied ‘complete risk disclosure information’, containing all dimensions of risk disclosure. 
The total scores were then expressed as a percentage, ranging from the lowest (0%) to the highest (100%) 
(Appendix 2 contains examples of risk disclosures and how they were classified and coded).9  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 To further test H1 to H7, data was collected on ownership, including block ownership (BOWN), 
government ownership (GOWN), and institutional ownership (IOWN) and board characteristics, including board 
size (BSIZE), independent non-executive directors (INED), and board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender 
(BDIV). Additionally, and to control for potential omitted variables bias (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), we 
included an extensive number of control variables. These covered audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure 
(CAPX), cross-listing (CLIST), the presence of a CG committee (CGCO), the presence of a CSR committee 
(CSRCO), leverage (LEV), firm size (LNTA), profitability (OPFT), risk (RISK), sales growth (SGR), industry 
dummies (IND), and year dummies (YED). For brevity, we do not develop direct theoretical links between these 
control variables and CRD, but there is extensive theoretical and empirical literature that suggests they can 
influence CRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Amran et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Greco, 2012).   
 Companies normally differ in the opportunities and challenges that they encounter over time (Petersen, 
2009; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). This can result in a scenario whereby CRD and CG practices are jointly and 
dynamically determined by unobserved company-specific hetereogeneities, such as  managerial talent, corporate 
culture and complexity (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which simple OLS regressions may be unable to detect 
(Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Hence, given the panel nature of our data and following past studies (Henry, 
2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012), we conduct our analyses by using panel data regression techniques in order 
to control for potential endogeneities that may arise from unobserved company-specific heterogeneities. Therefore, 
                                                 
9A single coder performed the content analysis for this study. However, to ensure consistency, reliability, and validity, an initial sample of 10 
annual reports (2 from each industry) were coded independently by two coders. In the first stage of pre-testing or piloting, each coder coded 5 
annual reports. No major differences emerged, and minor differences were discussed and agreed, with no differences emerging in the subsequent 
(second stage) pre-testing of the coding instrument on the remaining 5 annual reports between the two coders.  
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and assuming all the hypothesised relations are linear, our main fixed-effects regression model to be estimated is 
specified as follows:    
                                 121710 i itiitii itiit CONTROLSCGCRD                                             (1) 
where CRD is either our quantity (CRDS) or quality (CRDI) proxy for corporate risk disclosures, CG refers to the 
seven corporate governance variables, namely, BOWN, GOWN, IOWN, BDIV, BSIZE, INED and DBLS, and 
CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPX, CGCO, CLIST, CSRCO, LEV, LNTA, OPFT, 
RISK, SGR, IND and YED, with γ referring to the company-specific fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of the 
mean-differences of all time variant variables.10  
We present the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, bivariate and multivariate 
regression analyses and additional analyses in the following sections. 
 
6. Empirical results and discussion 
 
6.1. Descriptive statistics, univariate and bivariate analyses 
 
 Panels A and B of Table 2 present summary descriptive statistics of the quantity/sentence count (CRDS) 
and quality/disclosure index (CRDI) measures and the three thematic categories: financial (CFRDS/CFRDI), 
operational/business (CORDS/CORDI), and strategic (CSRDS/CSRDI) for all firm years, as well as for each of the 
ten firm-years investigated, respectively. A number of interesting findings emerge from the descriptive statistics. 
First, they suggest that there is a considerable degree of variation in the disclosures. For instance, CRDS (CRDI) 
ranges from a minimum of 17 (6.42%) to a maximum of 1,183 (72.45%) with the median firms disclosing 483 
(39.37%) sentences (disclosure index score), respectively. Second, and consistent with previous CRD studies (Raj 
& Handley-Schachler, 2009; Greco, 2012), there has been a steady increase in corporate risk disclosures over time. 
For instance, the average corporation disclosed 241 (15.63%), 285 (17.94%), 333 (20.46%), 371 (24.75%), 418 
(31.32%), 506 (36.45%), 589 (42.63%), 649 (49.46%), 728 (52.61%) and 780 (55.93%) sentences (disclosure index 
score), respectively, in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, accounting for over 200 
                                                 
10We acknowledge that our choice is between fixed- and random-effects, but a Hausman specification test rejected random-effects in favour of 
fixed-effects. Intuitively, this is consistent with the use of non-random/stratified instead of a random sampling procedure. We also follow Guest 
(2009) and Ntim et al. (2012) in implementing the mean-difference technique, which is more robust in the presence of hetereoscedasticity 
(Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). However, we get essentially similar results if we run our fixed-effects models by employing the year 
dummy alternative instead of the mean-difference method.  
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percentage points increase over the ten-year period investigated. This appears to suggest that SA listed corporations 
attach some importance to risk management and disclosure.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 Third, similar increasing patterns can be observed with respect to the three CRD thematic categories. For 
example, CFRDS (CFRDI) range from 2 (3.70%) to 240 (59.26%) with an average of 108 (30.52%) sentences 
(disclosure index score) and increasing steadily from 22 (8.75%) in 2002 to 174 (45.03%) in 2011. The pattern of 
increases in CORDS (CORDI) and CSRDS (CSRDI) are similar to those of CRDS (CRDI). Fourth, and on 
comparative basis, disclosure levels are highest in the case of CORDS (CORDI) and least with respect to CFRDS 
(CFRDI). This is not surprising, since unlike the CFRDS (CFRDI) and CSRDS (CSRDI) which contain 9 and 11 
disclosure items respectively, the CORDS (CORDI) scope is broader, covering 30 disclosure items ranging from 
issues, such as governance  to customer satisfaction.  As will be discussed further, the findings also provide support 
for past evidence (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Greco, 2012), which suggests that CRD are 
primarily non-financial in nature. Further, recent evidence (Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; 
Greco, 2012) suggests that corporations tend to make more disclosures regarding their operational and strategic 
risks during a financial crisis. The focus on non-financial (i.e., operational and strategic) risks, therefore, seems to 
partly reflect the operational (i.e., business) and strategic (i.e., economy wide) challenges that were experienced by 
the sampled companies during the recent 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Finally, and although there is evidence 
that the level of CRD in the pre-07/08 period (i.e., 2002 to 2006) is lower than that of 07/08 period, those of the 
post-07/08 period (i.e., 2009 to 2011) are also higher than that of 07/08, suggesting a generally increasing trend in 
CRD behaviour over time. This indicates that CRD behaviour during the 07/08 global financial crisis was not 
substantially or uniquely different from that in the pre- and post-periods. For example, and consistent with the 
general increasing trend in CRD behaviour over-time, the average corporation scored 31.32% (418 sentences) of 
the total of 265 disclosure points in 2006 compared with 36.45% (506 sentences), 42.63% (589 sentences), 49.46% 
(649 sentences), 52.61% (728 sentences), and 55.93% (780 sentences) in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, 
respectively, with the three sub-categories also depicting largely similar CRD behaviour over-time. 
As the CRD reported in Table 2 only indicates the quantity/volume (sentence count) and quality/level 
(disclosure index) rather than the focus of the disclosures, Table 3 contains summary descriptive statistics of CRD 
behaviour with particular regard to their focus. To quantify the  focus of the CRD, we classify the CRD sentences 
into ‘past/historical/backward looking’ versus ‘future/forward looking’, ‘bad/negative’ versus ‘good/positive’, and 
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‘qualitative/non-monetary’ versus ‘quantitative/monetary’ and express each category as a percentage of the total 
CRD sentences. Irrespective of the type of CRD examined, and consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(Lajili & Zeghal, 2005; Berger & Gleibner, 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011; Greco, 2012), the 
main evidence emerging from Table 3 is that CRD are largely focused on ‘past’, ‘good’, ‘qualitative’ and ‘non-
financial’ oriented information. For example, about 82% of CRD are non-financial in nature (i.e., 
operational/business and strategic) compared with 18% financial ones. Similarly, about 27%, 14%, and 38% of 
CRD are focused on ‘past/historical’, ‘good/positive’ and ‘qualitative/non-monetary’ oriented information, 
respectively, compared with 12%, 6%, and 3% for ‘future/forward looking’, ‘bad/negative’, and 
‘quantitative/monetary’ oriented information. The CRD behaviour for the three sub-categories is also generally 
similar to that of the summary measure. Further, past evidence (Amran et al., 2009; Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Oliveira et al., 2011) suggests that managers tend to disclose historical’, ‘positive’ and ‘qualitative’ oriented risk 
information because it is helpful in promoting corporate legitimacy, good image, and reputation (legitimacy 
theory). In contrast, ‘forward looking’, ‘negative’ and ‘quantitative’ oriented information is, more reliable and 
useful to stakeholders (stakeholder theory), such as investors in making investment decisions.   
Finally, and with regard to the focus of CRD behaviour over the ten-year period examined, the evidence is 
mixed with no clear cut trend emerging in terms of the pre-, during and post-07/08 financial crisis. For example, 
Table 3 suggests that past information contained in CRDS constituted 28%, 26%, 29%, 30%, 29%, 25%, 24%, 
26%, 27%, and 25% in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively, suggesting 
erratic instead of consistent changes in the focus of the disclosures.  Similar inconsistent trends are observable for 
the three sub-categories, indicating that the 07/08 financial crisis has not necessarily changed the focus of the CRD. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
To provide evidence on the various formats through which CRD are communicated, Table 4 presents the 
percentage of companies disclosing each of the 50 risk items under the three different formats: ‘texts (TXT)’; 
‘numbers/tables (N/T)’; and ‘graphs/pictures (G/P)’. First, and irrespective of the type of risk investigated, the main 
new evidence from Table 4 is that CRD are predominantly comprised of ‘texts/narratives’ with a small number of 
the risk disclosures being in the form of ‘numbers/tables’ and ‘graphs/pictures’, providing further support for the 
evidence contained in Tables 2 and 3 that CRD are largely non-financial and qualitative in nature.  For example, 
whereas about 65% of the sampled firms disclosed information relating to interest rates in the form of 
texts/narratives, only 22% and 2% did so in the form of ‘numbers/tables’ and ‘graphs/pictures’, respectively. 
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Second, and also in line with the findings reported in Tables 2 and 3, the percentage of firms making financial risk 
disclosures is the lowest, whilst those making operational/business risk disclosures is the highest. Third, the risk 
item with the least percentage of disclosure is ‘financial instruments/derivatives’, whilst the item with the highest 
percentage is ‘taxation’. Finally, a major policy implication that can be drawn from the analysis of the descriptive 
statistics is that regulatory authorities and policy-makers need to pay greater attention to both the nature and format 
of CRD. Specifically, regulatory authorities can improve risk reporting by encouraging corporations and managers 
to disclose more ‘forward-looking’, ‘quantitative’ and ‘monetary’ oriented risk information that are likely to be 
more accurate, reliable, and relevant to stakeholders, such as investors and employees, in their decision making. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 5 reports the summary descriptive statistics for all the independent and control variables included in 
our analysis, with all distributions generally showing wide spreads. For example, BDIV ranges from a minimum of 
8% to a maximum of 89% with the average firm having about 31% of its board members being non-white. This 
suggests that despite the recommendations of King II and BEE act regarding the need for greater diversity in 
corporate boardrooms, SA boards remain predominantly white. In line with the results of past research (Ntim et al., 
2012), BSIZE is between 4 and 21 with an average of 11 board members, whereas DBLS suggests that over 98% of 
firms have a dual leadership structure. The values of BOWN, GOWN, INED and IOWN, as well as the control 
variables, suggest wide variability in our sample, which minimises any possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in our regression analysis to test for 
multicollinearity. For robust results, we report both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric 
coefficients, and, it is noticeable that the magnitude and direction of both coefficients are generally similar; 
indicating that no serious non-normality problems exist. Apart from the high (i.e., 0.769 in the case Pearson or 
0.758 in the case of Spearman) level of correlation between our quantity/volume/sentence count (CRDS) and 
quality/level/disclosure index (CRDI) measures, the bivariate correlations among the variables are fairly low, 
implying that there are no major multicollinearity problems. In addition, we examined scatter plots for P-P and Q-
Q, studentised residuals, Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics for homoscedasticity, linearity, normality 
and autocorrelation, respectively, with the tests indicating no serious violation of these linear assumptions (for 
brevity not reported, but available upon request). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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Further, Table 6 shows statistically significant connections between CRDS (CRDI) and CG variables, and 
also between CRDS (CRDI) and the control variables. For instance, and as predicted, BDIV, BSIZE, GOWN and 
INED are statistically significant and positively related to the CRDS (CRDI), whilst BOWN is statistically 
significant and negatively connected to the CRDS (CRDI).  
 
6.2. Multivariate regression analyses 
 
Table 7 contains the results of the fixed-effects regression analysis of the impact of CG on CRD based on 
the quantity/volume (sentence count) measure. Generally, the results suggest that the CG variables are significant in 
explaining differences in CRDS. To begin with, the coefficients on BOWN and IOWN in Model 1 of Table 7 are 
negative and statistically significant, implying that SA corporations with high BOWN and IOWN are more likely to 
make significantly less risk disclosures. The negative connection between BOWN and CRDS is in line with 
theoretical suggestions that BOWN mitigates agency conflicts (i.e., providing support for agency theory) by acting 
as a substitute for other CG mechanisms, and that there is a lesser need for managers to engage in high risk 
disclosures in order to legitimise their decisions/actions to shareholders. Our results also offer empirical support for 
H2 and previous evidence (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2011), which suggests that BOWN has a 
negative effect on CRD.  
By contrast, the negative link between CRDS and IOWN does not provide empirical support for H3, or to 
the findings of past studies (Abraham & Cox 2007; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012), which indicate that IOWN has a 
positive impact on CRD. It also generally contradicts the findings of studies that document a positive relationship 
between IOWN and voluntary disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2011; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2012). The findings appear to indicate that institutional shareholders are more like to be block-owners, 
whose information needs seem to have been met through direct contact rather than via CRD. As previously 
discussed, whilst institutional ownership in SA is pervasive, it is largely held in the form of tall pyramidical 
structures and complex cross-shareholdings. Thus, disclosure behaviour, including CRD of firms with high 
institutional ownership is more akin-to those with high block ownership because there is low public interest and 
thus, limited need for greater transparency and stakeholder accountability (stakeholder theory). The statistically 
significant and positive link between BOWN and IOWN (see Table 6) appears to support this interpretation. The 
economic significance of our evidence is that a one-standard deviation increase (decrease) in the BOWN and IOWN, 
for example, can be expected to be associated with a 5.5% (22.10 x 0.249) and 3.3% (23.76 x 0.138) decrease 
(increase) in CRDS, respectively.  
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The coefficients on GOWN, BDIV, BSIZE, and INED are statistically significant and positively related to 
CRDS, implying that H1, and H4 to H6 are empirically supported. In contrast, DBLS has a positive, but statistically 
insignificant connection between DBLS and CRDS fails to offer empirical support for H7, or to the findings of 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). This may be explained by the ubiquitous nature of DBLS in SA (i.e., as reported in 
Table 5, on average, over 98% of the sampled firms have a DBLS) primarily due to the fact that it is an important 
part of the recommendations of King II, resulting in limited cross-sectional variation among the sample firms. It 
also suggests further that the agency theory explanation that separating the roles of CEO and chairman can enhance 
CRD by improving the effectiveness of managerial monitoring may not be applicable in corporate settings, such as 
SA, where a majority of firms have DBLS.  
The positive connection between GOWN and CRDS offers empirical support for the results of Eng and 
Mak (2003), Ntim et al. (2011), Khan et al. (2012), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012), but is inconsistent with the 
findings of Dam and Scholtens (2012) that suggest that government ownership is negatively associated with 
voluntary disclosure. It also provides further empirical support for our multi-theoretical framework that 
incorporates insights from institutional, legitimacy, resource-dependence and stakeholder theories. One theoretical 
implication of this is that the SA government is a powerful stakeholder (stakeholder theory) for corporations with 
high GOWN. Thus, corporations commit to high levels of CRD in order to signal their congruence with government 
initiatives, values, norms and rules (institutional and legitimacy theories), and thereby facilitate access to critical 
resources, such as government contracts and concessions (resource-dependence theory). This appears to be the case 
in SA, where the government is a powerful stakeholder with strategic GOWN, and has shown keen interest in 
affirmative action, stakeholder, CG and disclosure issues (Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012).  
The positive link between BDIV and CRDS offers empirical support for the findings of Barako and Brown 
(2008), Ntim et al. (2011), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012), which suggest that corporate boards of diverse ethnic 
and gender backgrounds tend to make more voluntary disclosures. More generally, the evidence adds to the results 
of past studies (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012) that indicate that board diversity on the basis of 
gender and ethnicity has a positive effect on organizational outcomes. Together, our board diversity results appear 
to offer high empirical support for the predictions of our multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights 
from agency, institutional, legitimacy and stakeholder theories. That is, they indicate that boards of diverse ethnic 
and gender backgrounds are not only able to engage in greater managerial monitoring (agency theory), but can also 
help to provide a better connection with stakeholders (stakeholder theory), gain access to critical resources, such as 
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business contracts and contacts (resource-dependence), and enhance corporate legitimacy and reputation 
(institutional and legitimacy theories). A contextual explanation is that affirmative action regulations, such as EE 
and BEE that expect corporate boards to be diverse in order to reflect the ethnic and gender composition of the SA 
populace are prevalent (Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012). This leads to the formation of relatively 
diverse boards that are more able to put pressure (especially by the black and female members) on senior managers 
to engage in greater CRD. 
Further, the positive association between CRDS and BSIZE provides empirical support for the findings of 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), and finally, the positive connection between CRD and INED is consistent with 
previous evidence (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012) that INED has a 
positive effect on CRD. Overall, both results seem to suggest that the predictions of our mult-theoretical framework 
that incorporates insights from agency, institutional, legitimacy, resource-dependence and stakeholder theoires is 
highly applicable. For instance, larger boards are associated with greater managerial monitoring power (agency 
theory) and diversity in terms of expertise (resource-dependence) and stakeholder representation (stakeholder 
theory), which can enhance corporate legitimacy and reputation (institutional theory and legitimacy theory). 
Additionally, agency theory suggests that greater accountability, independence and responsibility associated with 
INED makes them more likely to respond to stakeholder concerns regarding CRD, as well as able to put pressure on 
managers to commit to high levels of CRD.  Overall, our evidence is not only statistically significant, but also 
economically important. Specifically, our results suggest that a one-standard deviation increase (decrease) in the 
BDIV, BSIZE, GOWN and INED, for instance, can be expected to be associated with a 3.6% (16.40 x 0.219), 0.43% 
(3.49 x 0.125), 2.6% (9.89 x 0.265) and 3.7% (18.54 x 0.199) increase (decrease) in CRDS, respectively. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Furthermore, our findings so far suggest that differences in the CRDS can largely be explained by the CG 
variables, but since the proxy contains CRD from three different categories, it is possible for the connection 
between each category and the CG variables to differ, with some potentially having strong links with the CG 
variables and others maintaining weak associations. Thus, to examine the link between each CRD category and the 
CG variables, we re-estimate equation (1) by replacing the CRDS with either the CFRDS, CORDS and CSRDS in 
turns, and the findings are, respectively, presented in Models 2 to 4 of Table 7. The coefficient on BOWN is shown 
to be statistically significant and negatively related to all three CRD sub-categories. Similarly, the coefficients on 
GOWN, BDIV and INED remain statistically significant and positively associated with all three CRD categories, 
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whereas those on DBLS remain positive and statistically insignificant, offering further empirical support for our 
previous evidence. In contrast, the statistical significance of the coefficients on IOWN and BSIZE are mixed. The 
coefficients on IOWN are negatively related to all three CRD categories, but none are statistically significant. 
Similarly, the coefficients on BSIZE remain positively associated with all three CRD categories, but only the 
coefficient on CORDS is statistically significant, evidence which in the main, is inconsistent with our previous 
findings that suggested that BSIZE is significantly and positively associated with CRDS, whilst IOWN is 
significantly and negatively related to CRDS.   
 
6.3. Additional analyses 
 
We carry out a raft of additional analyses to ascertain the robustness of our findings. First, and to ascertain 
whether the CRD behaviour and drivers differ over the pre- and post-2007/2008 global financial crisis periods, we 
re-run equation (1) by splitting our sample period into three sub-sample periods: pre-2007/2008 (i.e., 2002 to 
2006); 2007 to 2008; and post-2007/2008 (i.e., 2009 to 2011), with the results presented in Models 5, 6 and 7, 
respectively, of Table 7 being essentially the same  as those reported in Model 1 of the same table (apart from 
observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of the coefficients). This suggests that our evidence is largely 
robust to sub-sample estimations. 
 Second, and following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we estimate a lagged CRD-CG structure in order to 
additionally address potential endogeneity problems, whereby CRD and CG may be simultaneously determined, 
instead of the implicit theoretical and empirical assumption that CG influences CRD, by re-regressing equation (1) 
as a lagged structure specified as:  
                                       121 1171 10 i itiitii itiit CONTROLSCGCRD                                 (2) 
where everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except that we include a one year lag between CRD 
and CG in which the current year’s CRD depends on the previous year’s CG. Noticeably, the results presented in 
Model 8 of Table 7 are generally similar to those presented in Model 1 of the same table. This implies that our 
evidence is robust to estimating a lagged CRD-CG structure.  
Third, to examine whether our results are sensitive to the CRD proxy employed, we replicate our results in 
Table 7 by replacing our quantity/volume/sentence count CRD measure (CSRDS) with its quality/level/disclosure 
index alternative (CSRDI), and the results are reported in Models 1 to 7 of Table 8. Apart from slight sensitivities in 
the magnitude and statistical significance levels, our results based on sentence count reported in Table 7 remain 
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qualitatively the same as those presented in Models 1 to 7 of Table 8 based on the disclosure index. Given the high  
correlation between the CRDS and CRDI proxies (0.769 in the case of Pearson and 0.758 in the case of Spearman) 
(see Table 6), this is not surprising and thus, suggests that our findings are robust whether CRD is quantitatively or 
qualitatively measured.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
 Fourth, to account for potential endogeneities that may be caused by omitted variable bias, we rely on the 
widely used two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). However, to ensure 
that the 2SLS methodology is appropriate, and following Beiner et al. (2006), we first conduct a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman exogeneity (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 267) test for the existence of an endogenous connection between the 
CRD and CG variables. Applied to equation (1), the test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, and hence, 
we conclude that the 2SLS methodology may be ideal and that our fixed-effects results may be spurious. In the first 
stage, and based on extensive theoretical and empirical literature (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Beekes & Brown, 
2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Fifka, 2012; Ntim et al., 2011, 2012), we conjecture that our seven CG variables will 
be determined by all the twelve control variables. In the second stage, we employ their predicted parts as 
instruments and re-estimate equation (1) as follows: 
                                         121710 ˆ i itiitii itiit CONTROLSCGCRD                                 (3)           
where everything remains unchanged as specified in equation (1) except that we use the predicted parts from the 
first-stage estimation as instruments for the seven CG variables. The results reported in Model 8 of Table 8 are 
essentially similar to those presented in Model 1 of Tables 7 and 8, thereby implying that our evidence is robust to 
potential endogeneities that may arise from omitted variables. The slight increase in the magnitude of the 
coefficients of the CG variables in Model 8 of Table 8 compared with those in Model 1 of Tables 7 and 8 is 
generally consistent with previous evidence that instrumented parts of CG variables tend to predict CRD more 
strongly than their un-instrumented parts (Beiner et al., 2006; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012). 
 Finally, a number of studies indicate that the impact of some CG mechanisms, such as BOWN, BSIZE and 
IOWN on corporate performance is non-monotonic (Morck et al., 1988; Beiner et al., 2006; Guest, 2009). For 
example, BOWN, BSIZE, and IOWN have been found to be non-linearly connected to corporate performance by 
Morck et al. (1988), Beiner et al. (2006), and Coles et al. (2008), respectively. To detect the presence of non-linear 
links between the CG mechanisms and CRD, we re-estimate equation (1) by including squared transformations of 
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BOWN, BSIZE, and IOWN. The findings are reported in Model 9 of Table 8. Noticeably, the coefficients on 
BOWN2, BSIZE2 and IOWN2 in Model 9 of Table 8 are statistically insignificant, with the findings remaining 
essentially the same as our previous findings contained in Table 7. Thus, our evidence does not provide empirical 
support for the presence of a curvilinear (including other transformation, such as cubic) link between the CG 
variables and CRD. 
 
7. Summary and conclusion 
 
 The 2007/2008 global financial crisis has highlighted the need for effective corporate governance (CG) 
through sound risk management and reporting practices. This paper has attempted to examine the crucial question 
of whether the quality of firm-level CG has any impact on the quality and extent of corporate risk disclosures 
(CRD) in South Africa (SA) from 2002 to 2011, covering the pre- and post-2007/2008 period. This also coincides 
with a period during which the SA authorities pursued CG and CRD policy reforms that explicitly require 
corporations to provide more transparent information on a set of recommended good risk management practices. 
Our findings, therefore, extent, as well as make a number of new contributions to the literature. 
 First, as the reasons for corporate engagement in CRD are diverse and often conflicting, we contribute to 
the literature by articulating and applying for the first time a multi-theoretical framework for interpreting CRD that 
incorporates unique insights from agency, institutional, legitimacy, resource-dependence, and stakeholder theories. 
Second, and using one of the largest datasets to-date on CG and CRD, we find that CRD are largely ‘non-financial 
(i.e., mainly ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ risks)’, ‘historical’, ‘good news’ and ‘qualitative’ in nature over the ten-
year period investigated. Additionally, we find evidence of a general increasing CRD trend over the period before, 
during, and after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. By contrast, we do not find any evidence to suggest that 
corporate risk disclosure behaviour during the 2007/2008 period is substantially different from those of the pre- and 
post-2007/2008 periods, Second, explicit content analysis of the number of sentence counts and the disclosure 
indices generally indicates that despite the expectation that the introduction of the 2002 King Report would speed-
up convergence of risk management and reporting practices, CRD among SA listed firms still differ substantially. 
However, the observed variability in CRD is largely consistent with those reported by previous studies, specifically 
demonstrating that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that listed companies in 
the SA context attach to CRD. Further, and despite concerns as to whether a voluntary CRD regime will be 
effective given the uniqueness of the SA corporate context, both our quantity and quality CRD measures indicate 
that risk disclosures among the sampled firms have generally improved over the ten-year period investigated. 
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 Third, and with respect to the determinants of CRD, we find that block ownership and institutional 
ownership are negatively associated with the extent of CRD, whereas board diversity, board size and independent 
non-executive directors are positively related to the extent of CRD. By contrast, dual board leadership structure has 
no significant connection with the extent of CRD. Our results are robust across a number of econometric models 
that sufficiently control for different types of endogeneity problems, as well as alternative CG and CRD proxies. 
Generally, our findings provide empirical support for the predictions of our multi-theoretical framework. 
Fourth, our findings have important implications for policy-makers and regulators. Evidence of increasing 
CRD suggests that efforts by various stakeholders, noticeably the SA Institute of Directors, at improving risk 
management and reporting have had some positive impact on the level of risk management and disclosure in the 
firms examined. However, given the wide differences in the level and focus of CRD suggests that some attention to 
the quality of risk disclosures by companies is required if they are to be useful to stakeholders. Specifically, 
regulatory authorities can enhance risk reporting by encouraging corporations and managers to disclose more 
‘forward-looking’, ‘quantitative’ and ‘monetary’ oriented risk information that are likely to be more accurate, 
reliable, and relevant to stakeholders, such as investors and employees, in their decision making. One possible 
suggestion is to adopt a disclosure framework that ensures that CRD meet a minimum threshold of relevance and 
reliability. In this case, developing a CRD framework along the lines of those proposed by the Global Reporting 
Initiative may be a step in the right direction.  
Finally, although our study is important and robust, its weaknesses need to be explicitly acknowledged and 
a future research agenda identified. While our sample is limited to SA companies, future studies can adopt our 
multi-theoretical framework within a cross-country context, enabling a more explicit generalisation of the results. 
Similarly, and as we exclude financials and utilities from our sample, new insights may be gained by investigating 
these types of companies in the future.  Our use of sentence counts and disclosure indices as our proxies for CRD 
have well-articulated limitations (see Hackston & Milne, 1996; Unerman, 2000; Beattie et al., 2004; Hooks & Van 
Staden, 2011), and whereas our results based on both our quantity and quality measures are essentially similar, 
future studies may enhance the analysis by using other measures, such as word counts and page counts. Further, 
due to data limitations, our analysis focused essentially on internal CG mechanisms, and future studies may 
enhance their analysis by investigating how external CG mechanisms, such as regulations, the media, and market 
for corporate control, influence CRD practices.  
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Appendix 1 
Corporate risk disclosures (CRD) index
CRD theme/type CRD item: information on or reference to Range of 
scores 
Total score 
per theme 
 Corporate financial risk disclosures    
(i) Financial  1.        Interest rates 0-6  
 
 
 
54 
 
 
2.        Exchange rates 0-6 
3.        Commodity prices 0-6 
4.        Liquidity 0-6 
5.        Credit/default 0-6 
6.        Capital adequacy/insolvency 0-6 
7.        Equity prices 0-6 
8.        Financial derivatives/instrument 0-6 
9.        Executive compensation/bonus/employee pension commitments 0-6 
 Corporate non-financial risk disclosures    
(ii) Operational/ 
Business 
  
10.      Competition/proprietary/copyright 0-6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
11.      Business processes and procedures/operations 0-6 
12.      Technology/information technology 0-6 
13.      Health and safety 0-6 
14.      Environment 0-6 
15.      Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name 0-6 
16.      HIV/Aids 0-6 
17.      Black economic empowerment/affirmative action 0-6 
18.      Compliance 0-6 
19.      Legal   0-6 
20.      Sourcing/raw material 0-6 
21.      Production/product development 0-6 
22.      Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott 0-6 
23.      Social contribution/community support 0-6 
24.      Internal audit and control 0-6 
25.      Human resources/employee/labour turnover/unrest 0-6 
26.      Integrity/management and employee fraud 0-6 
27.      Governance/leadership and management  0-6 
28.      Product/service failure 0-6 
29.      Non/financial reporting/disclosure/communication 0-6 
30.      Business ethics/corruption 0-6 
31.      Off balance sheet/contingent assets and liabilities 0-6 
32.      Stock/service obsolescence and shrinkage 0-6 
33.      Disclosure of risk mgt. policies/board statement/responsibilities 0-1 
34.      Disclosure of risk governance/committee existence 0-1 
35.      Disclosure of risk committee composition 0-1 
36.      Risk committee chairperson independence 0-1 
37.      Disclosure of risk committee members’ meetings attendance 0-1 
38.      Disclosure of risk committee remit 0-1 
39.      Disclosure of risk committee membership 0-1 
(iii) Strategic 40.      Sovereign/politics 0-6  
 
 
 
 
 
66 
41.      Regulation 0-6 
42.      Taxation 0-6 
43.      GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand 0-6 
44.      Unemployment rate 0-6 
45.      Inflation rate 0-6 
46.      Natural disasters/terrorism 0-6 
47.      Money supply/quantitative easing 0-6 
48.      Oil price 0-6 
49.      Public/budget deficit 0-6 
50.      Interest rate 0-6 
Total  50 CRD items  265 
Scoring procedure 
0:           No risk disclosure information 
1:           Risk disclosure focusing on only past/backward looking/historical information 
2:           Risk disclosure focusing on past/backward looking and future/forward looking information 
3:           Risk disclosure focusing on past, future and bad/negative news information 
4:           Risk disclosure focusing on past, future, bad/negative and good/positive news information 
5:           Risk disclosure focusing on past, future, bad/negative, good/positive and qualitative/non-monetary information 
6:           Risk disclosure focusing on past, future, bad/negative, good/positive, qualitative and quantitative/monetary information 
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Appendix 2 
Examples of corporate risk disclosures coding rules application 
Company 
name 
Examples of  risk disclosures Risk disclosure 
category
Risk disclosure 
sub-category
Classification
/Coding
 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
Group 
“Some of AngloGold Ashanti's mineral deposits and mining and exploration operations are located in countries that have 
experienced political instability and economic uncertainty. In all of the countries where AngloGold Ashanti operates, the 
formulation or implementation of government policies may be unpredictable on certain issues including regulations which impact 
on its operations and changes in laws relating to issues such as mineral rights and asset ownership, taxation, royalties, import and 
export duties, currency transfers, restrictions on foreign currency holdings and repatriation of earnings.” (AngloGold Ashanti, 
2009, p.188).  
 
 
Non financial  
(strategic risk) 
 
 
Politics/regulati
on/ taxation 
 
 
Future/negativ
e/qualitative/n
on-monetary 
 
 
MTN 
Group 
“The risk of bad debts from MTN’s subscribers has always been low because MTN has a predominantly prepaid client base. The 
risk of bad debts from key distributors is equally low as a result of the stringent credit policy and payment terms. The 
recoverability of interconnect debt from other operators in certain of MTN’s operating countries remains a risk to the Group and is 
problematic in certain operations. The expansion of the Group has reduced the overall impact of this as a result of reduced 
dependency on certain markets relating to this risk.” (MTN, 2007, p.121). 
 
 
Financial 
 
 
Credit/default 
 
Past/future/qu
alitative/non-
monetary 
 
 
Nampak 
Group 
“The South African operations have adopted a comprehensive HIV and AIDS awareness programme. Altogether 94% of 
employees underwent training in South Africa, 100% in both Namibia and Swaziland. As a result of this training, 85% of 
employees attended voluntary counselling and testing sessions on site (up from 68.5% in 2008) and 99% in both Swaziland and 
Namibia. The current prevalence rate is below that reported by other manufacturing companies and employees are continuously 
encouraged to come forward for testing and counselling.” (Nampak, 2009, p.49). 
 
Non-financial 
(operational 
risk) 
 
 
HIV/Aids 
 
Past/good/qua
litative/quantit
ative/non-
monetary 
 
Barloworld 
Group 
“In line with our commitment to lead in empowerment and transformation, all of our South African divisions achieved an audited 
Level 4 or better rating in terms of the DTI’s BBBEE scorecard. Equipment, motor retail and handling exceeded target by 
achieving Level 3 while Avis Rent a Car achieved Level 2. These ratings are a source of competitive advantage as they allow our 
customers to claim 100% credit or more for their procurement spending with us for the purpose of their own BEE scorecards.” 
(Barloworld, 2009, p.13). 
 
Non-financial  
(operational 
risk) 
 
Black economic 
empowerment/a
ffirmative 
action 
 
Past/positive/q
ualitative/qua
ntitative/non-
monetary 
 
 
Sabmiller 
Group 
“The results reported by the group are affected by currency movements. During the financial year, whilst the South African rand 
was relatively stable against the US dollar and ended the financial year at R6.20 to the US dollar, the weighted average rand/dollar 
rate deteriorated by 3% to R6.41 compared with R6.22 in the prior year. The Colombian peso has stayed largely level against the 
US dollar since the Bavaria transaction, ending the financial year at COP2,292 to the US dollar, against COP2,300 at the time of 
the transaction. Currencies in central Europe strengthened against the US dollar and this has contributed to the improvement in 
reported results.” (Sabmiller, 2006, p.24). 
 
 
Financial  
 
 
Exchange rates 
 
 
Past/bad/quali
tative/quantita
tive/monetary 
AngloGold 
Ashanti 
Group 
“In 2002 we reported a strong safety performance with Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate (LTIFR) of 0.37 injuries per 200,000 
hours worked (2001: 0.58 injuries per 200,000 hours worked). Given the high emphasis that Ashanti places on the safety and 
health of its employees, I am pleased to announce that we have further improved upon our 2002 performance and achieved a 
LTIFR of 0.30 injuries per 200,000 hours worked in 2003.” (AngloGold Ashanti, 2003, p.4). 
Non-financial 
(operational 
risk) 
 
Health and 
safety 
Past/positive/q
ualitative/qua
ntitative/non-
monetary 
 
 
Remgro 
Group 
“During the past financial year the economic climate in South Africa was stable due to government’s sustained maintenance of 
fiscal and monetary discipline. Prime interest rates decreased sharply from 17% to 11.5% following the decrease in the inflation 
rate which is currently in line with monetary policy’s guideline of between 3% and 6%. Interest rates in real terms are thus still 
high compared to South Africa’s trading partners and competitors in the world market. The strengthening of the South African 
rand against foreign currencies had a negative effect on the economy. The stability of the SA rand during the past financial year is 
however heartening and creates a climate for improved planning for the business sector.” (Remgro, 2004, p.10). 
 
 
Non-financial 
(strategic risk) 
 
Inflation 
rates/interest 
rates/money 
supply/public 
budget deficit 
 
 
Past/positive/q
ualitative/qua
ntitative/non-
monetary 
 
Aspen 
Pharmacare 
Group 
“In order to meet the diverse regulatory requirements across all of the markets concerned, significant investment has been made in 
the establishment of a dedicated regulatory team to ensure compliance with the applicable pharmaceutical legislation in the various 
territories into which these products are sold. In addition to managing the registration process of products for multiple territories, 
the regulatory team also facilitates adherence to specific packaging, product quality and stability requirements which may be 
unique to a territory.” (Aspen Pharmacare, 2009, p.45). 
 
Non-financial 
(strategic risk) 
 
Politics/Regulat
ory 
 
Past/qualitativ
e/non-
monetary 
 
Aveng 
Group 
“The Aveng Anti-Corruption Framework, which was developed in 2008, leverages the compliance programme and sets the 
parameters for ethical and fair practices throughout the Group, including training on all competition matters across all operations. 
The Group has also maintained a hotline as a precautionary measure to uncover any unethical or unlawful activities.” (Aveng, 
2009, p.22). 
 
Non-financial 
(operational 
risk) 
 
Business 
ethics/corruptio
n 
 
Past/qualitativ
e/non-
monetary 
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Table 1 
Summary of definitions and operationalisation of variables 
Corporate risk disclosures (CRD) variables – quantity/volume measure (sentence count) 
CRDS  Is the total corporate risk disclosure (CRD) proxy covering three main types of risks: (i) financial; (ii)  
  non-financial (business/operational); and (iii) non-financial (strategic). It measures the extent (in terms  
  of sentence count) and nature (in terms of the three specified types) of CRD in corporate annual reports, 
  which is normalised by taking a natural log. 
CFRDS   Is the total sentence count of corporate financial risk disclosures (CFRD) covering risk arising from 
  adverse changes in nine broad areas:  interest rates; exchange rates; equity prices; commodity prices; 
  liquidity; credit; financial instruments/derivatives; capital adequacy/insolvency; and executive   
  compensation/bonus/employee pension commitments, which is normalised by taking a natural log. 
CORDS  Is the total sentence count of corporate operational/business risk disclosures (CORD) relating to thirty 
  different risk areas arising from internal day-to-day decisions and risks that a company willingly assume  
  in order to create a competitive advantage and generate value for shareholders, as specified in the  
  Appendix, which is normalised by taking natural logs. 
CSRDS  Is the total sentence count of corporate strategic risk disclosures (CSRD) covering eleven different risk 
  areas arsing from basic changes in the external/macro economic environment as specified in the 
  Appendix, which is normalised by taking natural logs. 
Corporate risk disclosures (CRD) variables – quality/level measure (disclosure index) 
CRDI  A CRD index containing 50 items based on the three major types of risk specified by King II: (i)  
  financial (CFRDI); (ii) non-financial (operational/business - CORDI); and (iii) non-financial (strategic - 
  CSRDI). All 50 items (except seven, all of which are scored from 0 to 1) have a score ranging from 0 to  
  6, resulting in a total potential score of 265; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. The Appendix 
  contains the detailed 50 items and the scoring procedure. 
Corporate governance (CG)/ownership and board characteristics variables 
BDIV Percentage of male and female non-white directors (blacks, Asians and mixed race) to the total number of 
directors on the board of a company. 
BOWN  Percentage of ordinary shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company ordinary  
  shareholdings. 
BSIZE  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
DBLS  1, if the positions of company chairperson and CEO are held by different persons, 0 otherwise. 
GOWN  Percentage of government ownership to total company ordinary shareholdings. 
INED  Percentage of independent non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board of a firm. 
IOWN   Percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders. 
Control variables 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
  Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
CAPX   Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
CGCO  1, if a company has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise 
CLIST  1, if a company is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
CSRCO  1, if a company has set up a corporate social responsibility committee, 0 otherwise. 
LEV   Percentage of total debt to total assets.  
LNTA  Natural log of total assets. 
OPFT   Percentage of operating profit to total assets. 
RISK  Standard deviation of the OPFT variable. 
SGR  Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. 
IND  Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil gas; consumer goods, consumer 
  services + health care; industrials; and technology + telecoms firms. 
YED  Dummies for each of the ten years from 2002 to 2011 inclusive. 
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Table 2 
Summary descriptive statistics of all corporate risk disclosures  
          All           2002          2003          2004         2005        2006      2007        2008         2009         2010         2011 
Panel A: Corporate risk disclosures based on quantity/volume measure (sentence count) 
Total corporate financial risk disclosures (CFRDS – total sub sentence count) 
Mean              108               22              39             46            54            65           93           119           130           156            174              
Median           120               18              35             43            48            57           79           110           125           139            160 
STD                 86               15              28             32            40            44           58             66             72             78              84 
Min                  02               02              02             02            02            02           07             07             07             07              07 
Max               240               66              78             86            95          122          140          175            194           212           240 
Total corporate operational/business risk disclosures (CORDS – total sub sentence count) 
Mean             276             155            170           197          218          236           261          304           330           355           373                                     
Median          238             136            172           199          205          217           265          318           339           371           386 
STD              263             110            135           154          172          195           209          225           230           240           248 
Min                 11               11              11             11            16            18             33            48             52             58             69              
Max              545             274            306           330          359          370            401          442           479           493           545                
Total corporate strategic risk disclosures (CSRDS – total sub sentence count) 
Mean            136               62              74             88            96          113            149          160           186           212           230                                     
Median         122               58              72             85            98          117            152          149           173           200           216 
STD             162               45              69             71            85            94            120          130           142           146           154       
Min                04               04              06             06            06            06              13            17             25             31             39         
Max             398             155            174            210          233         257            290           336          359           370            398 
Total corporate risk disclosures (CRDS – total sentence count) 
Mean           526             241             285           333          371         418            506           589          649           728            780 
Median        483             210            279            320          356         410            485           574          642           710            775 
STD            678             182            238            265          299         348            394           435          456            483            498 
Min               17               17              19              19            24           26              53             72            84              96            115 
Max         1,183              495            558            626          687         749            830           953       1,032        1,075         1,183 
Panel B: Corporate risk disclosures based on quality/level measure (disclosure index - %) 
Total corporate financial risk disclosures (CFRDI - % sub score) 
Mean       30.52            8.75            9.98        13.44        17.25      25.31        33.06        37.75         40.88         42.70       45.03  
Median    27.78            7.40            9.26        12.96        14.81      24.07        31.48        37.04         40.74         42.59       44.44 
STD        15.46            2.03            3.09          3.61          4.12        5.19          7.21        10.58          11.33        12.88       14.43 
Min           3.70            3.70            3.70          3.70          3.70        3.70          7.41          7.41            7.41          7.41         7.41            
Max        59.26          11.11          14.81        16.67         18.52     22.22        33.33         44.44         48.15        53.70       59.26            
Total corporate operational/business risk disclosures (CORDI - % sub score) 
Mean      48.65          17.86          19.74        22.28         27.62      31.42       42.18         49.85         57.43         63.49       66.72 
Median   48.27          16.65          17.93        20.69         26.90      29.66       38.62         47.59         55.17         60.69       65.52 
STD       22.45            5.75            7.46          8.25           9.02      10.65       13.23         16.32         17.06         18.96       20.54       
Min          7.59            7.59            7.59          7.59         12.41      12.41       12.41         12.41          14.48        14.48       14.48           
Max       88.28          28.27          33.79        37.24         44.83      49.66       58.62         71.03          75.86        82.76       88.28   
Total corporate strategic risk disclosures (CSRDI - % sub score) 
Mean     37.95         13.75           16.38         18.39        21.75       24.89       32.40        43.68           46.50        52.39      57.86                   
Median  36.36         12.12           15.15         18.18        21.67       22.73       30.30        37.78           42.24        48.48      54.46 
STD      19.81           3.79             5.06           5.62          6.93         8.01         9.96        12.22           14.18        16.86      18.55 
Min         4.55           4.55             4.55           6.06          6.06         6.06         7.58          7.58             9.09          9.09        9.09 
Max      75.76         18.18           22.72          25.75        30.30       34.85       42.42       51.51            60.06       69.70      75.76          
Total corporate risk disclosures (CRDI – total % score) 
Mean     41.97        15.63           17.94         20.46        24.75       31.32        36.45       42.63           49.46        52.61       55.93                               
Median  39.25        14.72           16.60         19.62        23.34       29.81        34.72       41.51           45.28        48.30       52.21 
STD      18.37          6.61             7.66            8.71       10.91       11.86        13.33       14.18           15.44        16.70       17.57 
Min         6.42          6.42             6.42            6.42         6.42         7.92          7.92         9.43             9.43          9.43         9.43            
Max      72.45        30.19           33.96          37.74       45.66       50.57        55.85       60.38           64.90         69.43       72.45     
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Table 3 
Summary descriptive statistics of all corporate risk disclosures as a percentage of total sentence counts  
    All     2002      2003        2004        2005        2006        2007        2008        2009         2010          2011 
Corporate risk disclosures based on the quantity/volume measure (sentence count) 
Total corporate financial risk disclosures (CFRDS – as % of total sub sentence count) 
Past            38              40               36               39            42            40            36            33            35             37               39                          
Future        10                9               12               10              8            11            14            12            10             12               10 
Bad              4                5                 3                 4              2              3              7              9              8               6                 5 
Good          22             18               17               19             22           19            13            11            14              15              16 
Qual.          20             24               25               23             20            20           21            25             25             24              24 
Quan.           6               4                 7                 5               6              7             9            10               8               6                6 
Total        100           100             100             100           100          100         100          100           100           100            100 
Total corporate operational/business risk disclosures (CORDS – as % of total sub sentence count) 
Past            24             26               23               25             27            24           22            20             21             23              25            
Future        15             12               14               13             11            13           12            14             17             14              13 
Bad              4               4                 5                 5               6              6             8              9             10               8                8 
Good         14              13              14               16             14            12           10             11            12             14              13 
Qual.         41              42              40               38             40            42           44             43            38             39               38 
Quan.          2                3                4                 3               2              3             4               3              2               2                 3 
Total       100            100            100             100           100          100         100           100          100           100             100 
Total corporate strategic risk disclosures (CSRDS – as % of total sub sentence count) 
Past           28              26             29                27             25            28           24             22            25             27               29 
Future       10              12             10                13             16            14           17             15            13              11              12 
Bad             8               7                6                  6               5              6             9             10            10               8                 6 
Good        12             15              14                12             14             13           11            13            14              15              14 
Qual.        39             36              38                40             37             36           35            37            36              37              36 
Quan.        2                4                3                  2               3               3             4              3              2                2                3 
Tota      100            100             l00              100           100           100         100          100          100            100            100 
Total corporate risk disclosure (CRDS – a % of total sentence count) 
Past         27              28              26               29              30             29           25            24            26              27              25 
Future     12              12              13               10              14             12           14            13            14              14              12 
Bad           6                5                7                 5                4               4             6              8              9                8                7 
Good      14              14              12               16              13             16           14            15            16               15             13 
Qual.      38              39              40               36              35             37           38            35            30               32             40 
Quan.       3                2                2                 4                4               2             3              5              5                 4               3 
Total    100            100            100             100            100           100         100          100          100             100           100 
Total corporate financial and non-financial risk disclosures as % of total corporate risk disclosures (sentence count) 
FIN        18             19              16                20              22            17            16            14            19                22            24 
NOF      82             81              84                80              78            83            84            86             81               78            76 
Total    100          100            100              100            100          100          100           100          100             100          100 
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Table 4 
Percentage of companies disclosing each of the 50 risk items under the three different formats: texts (TXT), numbers/tables (N/T) and graphs/pictures (G/P)  
Corporate financial risk disclosures TXT N/T G/P Corporate operational/bus. risk disclosures TXT N/T G/P Corporate strategic risk disclosures TXT N/T G/P 
Interest rates 65 22 2 Competition/ proprietary/copyright 93 42 30 Sovereign/politics 69 0 0 
Exchange rates 67 13 5 Business processes and 
procedures/operations 
100 36 12 Regulation 76 23 0 
Commodity prices 68 27 1 Technology/information technology 96 41 8 Taxation 100 100 0 
Liquidity 75 26 7 Health and safety 99 36 31 GDP growth/market demand/aggregate 
demand 
94 75 12 
Credit/default 72 23 15 Environment 97 28 20 Unemployment rate 95 69 8 
Capital adequacy/insolvency 77 34 18 Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name 100 25 18 Inflation rate 98 85 40 
Equity prices 89 37 15 HIV/Aids 94 16 14 Natural disasters/terrorism 24 2 0 
Financial derivatives/instrument 18 6 2 Black economic empowerment/affirmative 
action 
99 37 30 Money supply/quantitative easing 52 30 4 
Executive compensation/bonus/employee 
pension commitments 
100 92 0 Compliance 100 16 28 Oil price 86 64 29 
- - - - Legal   85 24 7 Public/budget deficit 62 36 7 
- - - - Sourcing/raw material 76 20 9 Interest rate 69 48 4 
- - - - Production/product development 97 19 22 - - - - 
- - - - Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott 100 38 25 - - - - 
- - - - Social contribution/community support 87 30 28 - - - - 
- - - - Internal audit and control 94 37 22 - - - - 
- - - - Human resources/employee/labour 
turnover/unrest 
100 25 14 - - - - 
- - - - Integrity/management and employee fraud 18 4 0 - - - - 
- - - - Governance/leadership and management  100 35 17 - - - - 
- - - - Product/service failure 67 33 2 - - - - 
- - - - Non/financial 
reporting/disclosure/communication 
100 100 85 - - - - 
- - - - Business ethics/corruption 22 3 0 - - - - 
- - - - Off balance sheet/contingent assets and 
liabilities 
40 36 2 - - - - 
- - - - Stock/service obsolescence and shrinkage 51 28 4 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk management 
policies/board statement/responsibilities 
76 0 0 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk governance/committee 76 47 35 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk committee composition 76 44 37 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk committee chairperson 76 40 34 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk committee members’ 
meetings attendance 
58 37 26 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk committee remit 76 0 0 - - - - 
- - - - Disclosure of risk committee membership 76 42 15 - - - - 
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Table 5 
Summary descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables for all 500 firm years 
Variable           Mean            Median                     STD                  Maximum               Minimum 
Panel A: Independent (corporate governance/ownership and board characteristics) variables 
BDIV (%)              31.46    24.00                   16.40            89.02                7.80 
BSIZE   11.29    11.00                     3.49            21.00                4.00 
BOWN (%)              54.62    53.08                   22.10            96.44                5.94 
DBLS (%)                      98.95                 100.00                    36.04                     100.00                      0.00 
GOWN (%)    8.49      6.83         9.89            78.57    0.00 
INED (%)                       47.12                   44.63                    18.54                       94.62                     5.38 
IOWN (%)  78.30    88.90                   23.76            98.73                5.94 
Panel B: Control variables 
BIG4 (%)  86.72              100.00       36.11          100.00                0.00 
CAPX (%)    8.43      6.85         6.49            64.76                0.00 
CGCO (%)  50.00   50.00       50.00          100.00                0.00 
CLIST (%)            39.44     0.00       48.73          100.00                0.00 
CSRCO (%)              37.89     0.00       54.92          100.00    0.00 
LEV (%)  49.53   52.61                   17.50            92.74                2.38 
LNTA                 3.89     3.80                       0.87  5.97                0.75 
OPFT (%)                       14.76    13.75       10.51            78.52             -20.44 
RISK (%)  34.60   20.39       45.90          394.38    2.97  
SGR (%)              4.76     8.72       29.63            95.69             -97.40 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV); board size (BSIZE); block ownership 
(BOWN); dual board leadership structure (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); independent non-executive directors (INED); 
institutional ownership (IOWN); audit firm size (BIG4); capital expenditure (CAPX); the existence of a corporate governance committee 
(CGCO); cross-listing (CLIST); the existence of a corporate social responsibility committee (CSRCO); leverage (LEV); firm size (LNTA); 
profitability (OPFT); risk (RISK); and sales growth (SGR). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used.  
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Table 6 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the variables for all 500 firm years 
Variable  CRDS    CRDI      BDIV    BOWN    BSIZE    GOWN    INED    IOWN    OPFT    BIG4      CAPX   CGCO   CLIST   CSRCO      LEV     LNTA    RISK         SGR       DBLS 
CRDS                  .758***   .124***   -.185***    .120***     .195***     .198***    -.116***   .080*       .317***    -.030     .389***    .475***    .418***     -.032       .234***      .186***      .037         .040 
 
CRDI .769***                    .128***   -.192***   .147***      .149***    .105**    -.030       .262***   .330***    -.031     .520***    .193***    .216***     -.044      .168***   .194***       .088**       .029                
 
BDIV      .118***    .110***                       -.050       .430***     .126***    .138***     .052      -.109***   .111***    .077*     .009       -.047      -.049    .018       .366***   -.089**      .130***  .032 
  
BOWN   -.130***   -.160***  -.036
 
     
 
          -.028         -.273***   -.171***    .240***   -.055      .039        .112***   .011       -.065      -.076*       .089**   -.040         .114***     -.081**     -.050 
        
BSIZE     .125***    .146***    .348***  -.009             .320***     .045       .162***    -.070*     .045        .128***  -.099**     .096**      .008       -.150***   .637***   -.060         .030     .026        
 
GOWN .169***     .180***    .073*    -.210***     .218***                      .240***   .260***     .010       .008       .077*      .110***    .189***    .204***   -.307***   .530***     .090**      .056          .018 
 
INED      .185***     .190***   .136***  -.147***     .009       .112***                  .054        .046     -.067       -.020      .095**      .103**     .020       -.207***   .220***     .050          .099**      .030 
 
IOWN   -.162***   -.048        .011       .370***    .135***   .197***     .060                        -.194***  -.050        .131      -.029       -.040       -.059        .017       .200***    -.118***     .020         .042 
 
OPFT     .080*       .225***    -.079*    -.108**    -.070*     .016         .079*
 
      .288***                    .056       -.079*      .227***    .140***     .220***   -.018        .030        .509***    -.017        .063 
 
BIG4      .326***    .350***     .113***    .050       .085*      .040        -.060       -.017       .099**                      .076*      .250***    .230***     .058        -.081*      .012        .035        -.008        .027 
 
CAPX   -.010      -.044         .098**     .103**    .106**    .095**       -.040       .118***   -.062        .094**                    .038       -.010         .031        -.125***    .304***   -.027         .049       -.011 
 
CGCO    .380***   .529***     .020        .018      -.065      .070*         .096**    -.030       .201***     .249***    .048                      .275***     .167***    -.199***    .040        .154***      .056       .048 
 
CLIST    .440***   .218***    -.059       -.052      .080*     .163***       .108**     .015        .120***     .230***   .010    .274***           .326***     -.040       .211***    .109***      .040        .026 
 
CSRCO .374***   .210***    -.071*      -.060      .012      .138***      .030       -.088**      .220***    .056        .077**     .160***   .318***                    .009       .195***     .184***      .057        .082* 
 
LEV     -.039       -.045        .037        .078*    -.099**  -.135***      -.218***   -.012       -.015      -.060      -.152***   -.219***   .020        .017                       -.240***    -.048        -.034       -.017 
 
LNTA   .206***   .172***     .249**     -.070*     .605***   .409***       .232***    .167***     .010        .027      -.260***   .077*      .191***    .248***    -.220***                     .040        .061         .038 
 
RISK   .210***    .165***    -.078*       .106**   -.050      .084**        .020       -.215***     .630***   .063      -.047       .169***    .080*      .226***     -.040       -.009                        -.053        .025      
 
SGR    .040       .108**      .132***    -.089**    .110***   .064       .099**      -.008         .017      -.010      .116**      .088**     .025       .069        -.038         .150***      -.041                       .034 
 
DBLS  .047      .019         .026       -.040         .010      .052        .036           .051          .011       .029     -.018        .027        .044      .086*        -.032        .028            .040        .030                     
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, **,  and * 
denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: total corporate risk disclosures based on sentence count (CRDS); total corporate risk 
disclosures based on a disclosure index (CRDI); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV); board size (BSIZE); block ownership (BOWN); government ownership (GOWN); independent non-
executive directors (INED); institutional ownership (IOWN); profitability (OPFT); audit firm size (BIG4); capital expenditure (CAPX); the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCO); cross-listing 
(CLIST); the presence of a corporate social responsibility committee (CSRCO); leverage (LEV); firm size (LNTA); risk (RISK); sales growth (SGR); and dual board leadership structure (DBLS). Table 1 fully 
defines all the variables used. 
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Table 7 
The effects of corporate governance on corporate risk disclosure based on the quantity/volume measure (sentence count) 
Dependent variables 
                               ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. variables      CRDS          CFRDS          CORDS        CSRDS      PRE-07/08     07/08        Post-07/08  Lagged(CRDS) 
(Model)                     (1)                  (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5)              (6)                 (7)                    (8) 
Ownership variables:     
    BOWN            -0.249***         -0.169***         -0.180***        -0.175***        -0.220***       -0.208***       -0.214***          -0.236*** 
                            (0.000)            (0.000)           (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000) 
   GOWN              0.265***           0.172***         0.185***          0.196***         0.231***        0.210***         0.223***           0.254*** 
                            (0.000)            (0.000)          (0.000)           (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000) 
   IOWN              -0.138**            -0.049            -0.060            -0.057           -0.084           -0.072          -0.077              -0.115* 
                            (0.037)            (0.280)           (0.250)          (0.264)          (0.210)          (0.238)         (0.226)            (0.068) 
Board  variables:  
   BDIV               0.219***         0.160**   0.179***          0.168***     0.183***        0.172***   0.176***           0.195*** 
                           (0.000)           (0.018)            (0.005)          (0.010)    (0.000)         (0.000)  (0.000)           (0.000) 
   BSIZE              0.125**            0.034              0.102*            0.045              0.076            0.057            0.063             0.115* 
                           (0.048)           (0.376)           (0.089)           (0.358)            (0.294)         (0.326)         (0.312)           (0.075) 
   DBLS               0.069         0.023   0.030          0.039     0.050           0.043    0.047             0.056 
              (0.367)        (0.486)  (0.462)         (0.447)    (0.398)         (0.427)          (0.410)            (0.389) 
   INED                0.199***           0.157**           0.166**          0.150**            0.177***        0.168**           0.174**           0.183*** 
                           (0.000)            (0.025)           (0.020)          (0.033)           (0.010)         (0.017)           (0.013)          (0.000) 
Control variables: 
   BIG4  0.210***         0.150**   0.169**           0.158**     0.183***        0.172***   0.178***           0.195*** 
                            (0.000)           (0.030)  (0.020)         (0.025)   (0.000)         (0.010)  (0.005)            (0.000)  
   CAPX              -0.075            -0.022              -0.028           -0.033           -0.054           -0.044           -0.049             -0.060 
                           (0.342)            (0.467)            (0.452)         (0.436)          (0.380)          (0.396)         (0.413)            (0.364) 
   CGCO              0.258***         0.184***          0.197***         0.190***    0.225***         0.208***   0.219***           0.245*** 
              (0.000)         (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000)   (0.000)          (0.000)  (0.006)           (0.000) 
   CLIST               0.269***          0.210***           0.220***         0.215***         0.243***         0.230***        0.238***           0.252*** 
                            (0.000)           (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.001)          (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000) 
   CSRCO             0.185***           0.127**           0.136**          0.132**           0.169***         0.154**        0.160**              0.176*** 
                            (0.000)            (0.039)            (0.028)          (0.034)           (0.008)         (0.019)         (0.013)            (0.000) 
   LEV                 -0.126**            -0.008             -0.017           -0.012           -0.031            -0.023          -0.029              -0.119* 
                            (0.050)            (0.560)           (0.530)         (0.546)          (0.489)          (0.512)         (0.495)             (0.084) 
   LNTA               0.271***            0.176***          0.189***        0.180***         0.242***         0.225***        0.236***            0.260*** 
                            (0.000)            (0.000)           (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)              (0.000) 
   OPFT                0.186***           0.123*             0.135**          0.129**         0.167***         0.146**         0.153**             0.175*** 
                           (0.000)             (0.055)           (0.039)         (0.047)          (0.005)          (0.020)         (0.018)             (0.000) 
   RISK                0.248***          0.178***    0.186***         0.194***    0.223**          0.209***   0.217***            0.235*** 
                 (0.000)            (0.000)  (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000) 
   SGR                 0.064                0.009              0.015             0.020            0.044              0.030           0.040                0.056 
                           (0.376)             (0.476)           (0.460)         (0.451)         (0.425)           (0.440)        (0.432)              (0.390) 
   IND                 Included        Included          Included         Included       Included       Included      Included        Included 
   YED                Included        Included          Included         Included       Included       Included      Included         Included 
Constant               0.186              0.110               0.132            0.125           0.166             0.147            0.158                0.173 
                            (0.270)           (0.379)            (0.340)         (0.357)         (0.281)          (0.313)         (0.292)              (0.258) 
Durbin-Watson    2.195             1.785               1.978            1.865           2.140             2.040            2.110                 2.182 
F-value                8.930***          4.956***           5.294***        5.180***        7.230***          6.496***        6.852***             8.425*** 
Adjusted R2         0.426              0.360               0.373           0.365            0.380             0.371            0.376                 0.397 
N                            500                 500                  500              500               250                100               150                    450 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique 
along both year and industry dimensions.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
total corporate risk disclosures based on sentence counts (CRDS); corporate financial risk disclosures based on sentence count (CFRDS); corporate 
operational risk disclosures based on sentence count (CORDS); corporate strategic risk disclosures based on sentence count (CSRDS); block ownership 
(BOWN), government ownership (GOWN), institutional ownership (IOWN); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV); board size 
(BSIZE); dual board leadership structure (DBLS); percentage of independent non-executive directors (INED); audit firm size (BIG4); capital expenditure 
(CAPX); the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCO); cross-listing (CLIST); the presence of a corporate social responsibility committee 
(CSRCO); leverage (LEV); firm size (LNTA); profitability (OPFT); risk (RISK); sales growth (SGR); industry (IND); and year (YED). Table 1 fully defines 
all the variables used. 
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Table 8 
The effects of corporate governance on corporate risk disclosure based on the quality/level measure (disclosure index) 
Dependent variables 
                          ______________________________________________________________________________________           
Indep. variables   CRDI         CFRDI        CORDI       CSRDI      PRE-07/08       07/08          Post-07/08         2SLS              CRDI 
(Model)                  (1)               (2)               (3)               (4)                (5)                (6)                   (7)                 (8)                   (9) 
Ownership variables:     
    BOWN           -0.240***     -0.172***      -0.186***      -0.179***     -0.229***      -0.210***         -0.218***         -0.252***        -0.235*** 
                            (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)           (0.000)            (0.000)           (0.000) 
   BOWN2               -                  -                   -                   -                  -                    -                     -                       -                -0.024             
                               -                   -                   -                   -                  -                    -                     -                       -                (0.456) 
   GOWN            0.248***       0.169***       0.182***        0.190***      0.228***        0.206***          0.220***          0.260***          0.243*** 
                          (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)           (0.000)            (0.000)           (0.000) 
   IOWN            -0.119*         -0.053          -0.065           -0.060         -0.089          -0.078             -0.080             -0.143**         -0.125** 
                          (0.060)        (0.272)         (0.243)         (0.256)        (0.198)         (0.225)           (0.213)            (0.030)           (0.048) 
   IOWN2                -                  -                   -                   -                   -                    -                     -                      -                -0.013 
                               -                  -                   -                   -                   -                    -                     -                      -                (0.490) 
Board  variables:  
   BDIV             0.199***        0.167**   0.184***         0.173***       0.186***        0.177***        0.182***           0.224***         0.194*** 
                         (0.000)         (0.015)        (0.000)          (0.008)        (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)            (0.000)          (0.000) 
   BSIZE            0.119*          0.039           0.108*           0.052           0.080            0.060              0.073              0.137**           0.123** 
                         (0.070)         (0.367)        (0.080)         (0.346)         (0.285)         (0.317)           (0.296)            (0.040)           (0.049) 
   BSIZE2               -                  -                   -                    -                   -                    -                     -                      -                  0.018 
                              -                  -                   -                    -                   -                    -                     -                      -                 (0.475)             
   DBLS            0.064            0.026   0.035        0.047            0.059 0.049        0.055               0.075              0.070 
         (0.372)         (0.478)  (0.453)       (0.436)         (0.386)         (0.420)           (0.392)            (0.352)           (0.386) 
   INED            0.189***        0.160**         0.172**         0.155**         0.182***       0.173***          0.179***           0.210***          0.180*** 
                        (0.000)         (0.020)         (0.016)         (0.024)         (0.009)         (0.010)          (0.013)             (0.000)           (0.000) 
Control variables: 
   BIG4         0.203***         0.158**   0.174**       0.165**          0.189***       0.178***       0.180***            0.219***         0.196*** 
                       (0.000)          (0.025)  (0.016)      (0.020)          (0.000)        (0.006)      (0.002)             (0.000)           (0.000) 
   CAPX         -0.069           -0.027          -0.035          -0.038           -0.064          -0.053            -0.058              -0.080             -0.064 
                       (0.350)          (0.460)        (0.440)         (0.430)         (0.372)         (0.386)           (0.397)             (0.329)           (0.358) 
   CGCO          0.252***        0.189***        0.203***       0.196***        0.230***       0.212***      0.224***            0.265***           0.245*** 
        (0.000)         (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)      (0.006)             (0.000)           (0.000) 
   CLIST          0.258***        0.219***        0.227***       0.220***        0.249***       0.238***          0.244***           0.275***           0.250*** 
                       (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.000)           (0.000)            (0.000)            (0.000) 
   CSRCO        0.180***       0.132**          0.144**        0.139**          0.175***       0.167**           0.176***           0.194***           0.176*** 
                       (0.000)        (0.030)          (0.022)        (0.027)          (0.002)         (0.011)           (0.005)            (0.000)            (0.000) 
   LEV            -0.125*         -0.016           -0.024          -0.018           -0.039           -0.028            -0.036             -0.135**           -0.120* 
                       (0.063)        (0.549)          (0.521)        (0.538)          (0.480)         (0.500)           (0.485)           (0.042)             (0.068) 
   LNTA          0.265***       0.180***         0.194***       0.187***        0.250***        0.230***          0.240***         0.283***            0.260*** 
                      (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)             (0.000) 
   OPFT          0.180***        0.127**          0.142**        0.134**         0.175***         0.151**           0.159**           0.192***           0.174*** 
                      (0.000)         (0.050)         (0.031)         (0.040)         (0.000)          (0.017)           (0.011)           (0.000)             (0.000) 
   RISK           0.242***        0.183***  0.191***       0.199***       0.228**           0.213***       0.222***          0.253***           0.238*** 
          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)     (0.000)        (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000)            (0.000) 
   SGR            0.065            0.017            0.020            0.025           0.049              0.038              0.045              0.075               0.060 
                      (0.381)         (0.462)         (0.454)        (0.446)         (0.420)           (0.432)           (0.426)           (0.360)             (0.393) 
   IND            Included      Included      Included      Included      Included         Included        Included          Included         Included 
   YED           Included      Included     Included       Included      Included         Included        Included          Included         Included 
Constant         0.180           0.119           0.138            0.130           0.175               0.156              0.167             0.194                0.185 
                     (0.262)         (0.370)        (0.334)         (0.342)         (0.268)            (0.295)           (0.279)           (0.240)             (0.246) 
Durbin-W.     2.194           1.865           2.006            1.967           2.153               2.089              2.164              2.210               2.197 
F-value          8.639***       5.047***       5.394***        5.769***        7.895***          6.874***          7.210***          9.025***           8.732*** 
Adjusted R2   0.408           0.369           0.380            0.371            0.386              0.378              0.385              0.434               0.419 
N                      500              500              500               500               250                 100                 150                 500                  500 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique 
along both year and industry dimensions.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
total corporate risk disclosures based on the disclosure index (CRDI); corporate financial risk disclosures based on the disclosure index (CFRDI); corporate 
operational risk disclosures based on the disclosure index (CORDI); corporate strategic risk disclosures based on the disclosure index (CSRDI); block 
ownership (BOWN), government ownership (GOWN), institutional ownership (IOWN); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV); board 
size (BSIZE); dual board leadership structure (DBLS); percentage of independent non-executive directors (INED); audit firm size (BIG4); capital 
expenditure (CAPX); the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCO); cross-listing (CLIST); the presence of a corporate social responsibility 
committee (CSRCO); leverage (LEV); firm size (LNTA); profitability (OPFT); risk (RISK); sales growth (SGR); industry (IND); and year (YED). Table 1 
fully defines all the variables used.  
